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Public Ownership of Public Utilities: Have Stockholders
Outlived Their Useful Economic Lives?
This Comment proposes that regulation is an inadequate response to the
problems inherent in the private ownership of monopolies that provide basic
necessities: gas, electricity, water, and to some extent, telephone service.
Structural and legal analysis of utilities points to public ownership as the
preferable response to these problems.
After a presentation of the legal basis for regulating these industries and
of the limits placed on that regulation by the Supreme Court, this Comment
will examine current rate regulation practices and their implications. First,
some problems inherent in private ownership of utilities will be made explicit.
Second, the validity of the traditional justifications for private ownership will
be questioned in light of contemporary methods of utility construction financ-
ing. This Comment will suggest that utility stockholders are not earning their
profits, but rather, are earning returns on ratepayer moneys, not shareholder
investments. In particular, construction work in progress, allowance for funds
used during construction, and various financing methods will be analyzed.
Legislative, judicial, and administrative responses to public concern about
these financing mechanisms will be surveyed.
This Comment will conclude that, given the United States Supreme
Court's restriction on regulation and the integrality of profit motivation to
private ownership, state regulation of privately owned utilities inadequately
protects the public's interests. In addition, it will propose that stockholders,
who at one time provided the capital necessary for growth, are currently
dysfunctional within the utility industry. This Comment concludes that some
form of public ownership is the only viable solution.
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION
Two characteristics that make enterprises subject to regulation as public
utilities make private ownership of those enterprises inappropriate. One of
these characteristics is the essentiality and the relative nonsubstitutability of
the service. The other is that utilities are "natural" monopolies and the state
supports their monopoly position.2
I. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR: CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND PROB-
LEMS 2-3 (1977).
2. E.g., the state issues to a utility a certificate of public convenience and necessity, which gives a utility
the sole right to serve a particular region if the utility submits to state regulation. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, A
CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY RATEMAKING 31, 33 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as UTILITY RATEMAKING].
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Anyone who has spent a cold night without heat, has lacked hot water
with which to wash, or has had a medical emergency arise while his or her
phone was disconnected knows that the essentiality of these services is not
exaggerated. The common need for services provided by utilities is analogous
to what the Court described as "affected with a public interest" in Munn v.
Illinois,3 the landmark decision that laid the basis for public utility regula-
tion.4 This concept later was refined in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus-
trial Relations,5 which held that one test of whether a business is affected
with a public interest was "the indispensable nature of the service and the
exorbitant charges and arbitrary control to which the public might be sub-
jected without regulation., 6
The Wolff Court's fear of "exorbitant charges and arbitrary control" is a
function of the second characteristic that makes enterprises subject to regula-
tion-the perceived power of a monopoly. The monopoly position of utilities
is promoted by the state because of utilities' tendency toward a natural monop-
oly. A natural monopoly provides a service or a good more economically
when only one enterprise controls resource planning and demand for a partic-
ular market. This phenomenon is due to economies of scale and to physical
limits inherent in the type of good or service.7 Although the state authorizes
the monopoly position of utilities, it recognizes that the combination of the
profit motive and near-absolute control of a necessity would lead to un-
conscionable utility prices and practices in the absence of regulation." The
state perceives the problem with monopoly utilities to be lack of competition.
The regulatory process attempts to produce the same economic results as
would occur naturally in a competitively structured industry. 9 The state seeks
to eliminate monopoly overcharges, not to eliminate profits.
The United States Supreme Court has mandated that utility rates must
provide for profit if those rates are to withstand constitutional challenge under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which prohibit the confiscation of
property without due process. 10 In determining whether a rate mandated by a
government agency is confiscatory or "just and reasonable," the Court in
3. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
4. Id. at 126-35.
5. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
6. Id. at 538.
7. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR: CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND PROB-
LEMS 3-4 (1977); UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 29-30.
8. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 31.
9. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 19-20; Munkirs, Ayers & Grandys, Rape of the Rate Payer:
Monopoly Overcharges in the "Regulated" Electric Utility Industry, 8 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 57, 58
(1976).
10. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923). The text
of the amendments is as follows: "No person shall be... deprived of... property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of... property without due process of the
law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. " stated that the return
to the utility "should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integ-
rity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital."' 2 This
investor-oriented test is a reaffirmation of the test set out in Bluefield Water
Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission" :
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the
value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to
that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the
country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by
corresponding risks and uncertainties .... The return should be reasonably suf-
ficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be
adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its
credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its
public duties. '
4
Hence, not only does the Supreme Court recognize the cost of attracting
private capital as a cost of providing utility service, the Court makes the
attraction of private capital, and thus the investor, the focus and criterion by
which the fairness of rates is determined. The investor's rate of return is
constitutionally protected, but the consumer's right to public utility service,
either absolutely or at a reasonable price, is not. Since the investor's interests
take priority over the consumer's in the process of rate determination, utility
rates are set primarily to satisfy profit-motivated stockholders and creditors
and only secondarily to protect the public from unconscionable prices.
This investor-oriented standard is what regulatory commissions must
follow when determining utility rates, which are regulated on local, state, and
federal levels. State regulatory commissions, which have quasi-judicial
powers, regulate most retail sales of gas, electricity, water, and telephone
service. 15 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) administers
prices set by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 197816 for producers of gas and
interstate pipeline companies and approves construction of interstate pipeline
facilities. 17 FERC determines the rates and service standards for wholesale
electricity sales, 18 reviews agreements for system interconnections, has
authority over mergers of regulated utilities, and licenses hydroelectric power
project construction and operation, except those owned by other federal
agencies. 19 In addition, FERC issues orders concerning the Uniform System
of Accounts 20 that it prescribes for the gas and electric utilities it regulates.
11. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
12. Id. at 603.
13. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
14. Id. at 692-93.
15. E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 39 (1950).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. I 1978).
17. 1979 FERC ANN. REP. 1-2.
18. Wholesale sales of electricity accounted for 13% of total United States electricity sales in 1979. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. See generally I. BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 249-54 (1942).
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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates rates for inter-
state and foreign telephone service. FCC duties include approval of the con-
struction and operation of facilities and the prescription of a Uniform System
of Accounts for telephone carriers.2 1 State and federal commission decisions
are appealable to courts in their jurisdictions. 22 The courts review those deci-
sions in light of statutory provisions 23 and state and federal constitutional
standards.24
State commissions set rates by adding together earnings (profits) on the
utility's rate base, operating expenses, taxes, and depreciation.25 This equa-
tion determines the total revenues 26 the utility can collect from its customers:
Total Revenues = (Rate of Return X Rate Base) + Operation Expenses +
Taxes + Depreciation. 27
Thus, the profit or total earnings, as opposed to total revenue, of a utility is
determined by multiplying the rate of return (rate of profit) by the rate base. 8
The rate base is the amount or value of invested capital or property upon
which the utility is entitled to compensation.29 It includes plant, equipment,
and land. 30 The rate of return represents the cost of capital; it is the rate of
earnings for both debt and equity investors.3 Utility profits increase if either
21. 1979 FCC 45TH ANN. REP. 46.
22. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 12.
23. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1757 (West 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-7-16 (1974) ("The
review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the commission has regularly pursued its
authority, including a determination of whether the order or decision under review violates any right of the
petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or the state of Utah.").
24. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V., amend. XIV, § 1.
25. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 57.
26. The total revenues are allocated to customer class, e.g., residential, industrial, and commercial. For
each customer class revenues are divided among customer service charges, if any, and unit blocks, e.g., first 500
kilowatt-hours, second 500 kilowatt-hours; or first 3 minutes of telephone call, each succeeding minute. Rate
structure differentiations also may be made by the time of day or season during which the service is used.
U1ILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 120-21. See generally P. RODGERS, J. EDWARD SMITH, JR. &
R. PROFOZICH, CURRENT ISSUES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE SETTING 115-41 (1976) (published by
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners).
27. Another way of expressing this formula is:
R = C + Jr.
R represents the total revenue earned by a company through its tariff charges. C is a utility's expected cost for
goods and services, including taxes and depreciation for the period the prospective tariff is in effect. I stands for
the assets of a utility that are used but not consumed in business, i.e., rate base. The rate of return allowed on
both debt and equity capital is symbolized by r. Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 276 S.E.2d
179, 184 (W. Va. 1981).
28. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 52.
29. The value of the property may be set at the original cost, see, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
Dusquesne Light Co., 43 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 27 (Pa. P.U.C. 1981); current fair market value, see
Frankfurter, Hart & Henry, Rate Regulation, in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 10-13
(MacAvoy ed. 1970); replacement cost, see C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 232-38 (1969); or
by a mix of valuation methods, see, e.g., In re Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 43 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 417
(Tex. P.U.C. 1981).
30. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 52.
3 I. Id. at 53-54.
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the dollar amount of the rate base or the percentage rate of return is in-
creased. 
32
I. PROBLEMS ATTRIBUTABLE TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF UTILITIES
Given this regulatory framework, four interrelated problems are attribut-
able to the profit orientation of utilities: frequent and large rate increases, rate-
base inflation, uneconomical and shortsighted technological choices, and in-
adequate provision for those unable to pay standard rates for services. These
problems contribute to the fundamental deficiency of private ownership of
basic necessities: privately owned utilities do not and cannot provide these
necessities to the public at the lowest price possible.
A. Rate Increases
From 1970 to 1980 the Consumer Price Index for gas and electricity rose
110.6 percent, while the overall Consumer Price Index rose 79.6 percent.
33
The average residential electric bill increased over 180 percent during the
same period.34 The cost of gas to residential customers increased over 240
percent from 1970 to 1980. 3s
Why these drastic utility price increases? The increases may be attrib-
uted in part to the general inflation rate and to the extraordinary price in-
creases of some of the elements peculiar to the production of electricity or the
provision of other utility services. 16 However, the rest can be attributed to
increases in utility profits. The net income after expenses and taxes of tel-
32. For example, if the rate base is $2 million and the rate of return is iO%, the total earnings of the
company are $200,000 ($2,000,000 x .10 = $200,000). If the rate of return is increased to 12%, the company's
total earnings would increase by $40,000 ($2,000,000 x .12 = $240,000). If the rate of return is left at 10%, but the
rate base is increased to $3 million, the company's total earnings will again increase; with these figures earnings
would increase by $100,000 ($3,000,000 x .10 = $300,000). Since expenses, including depreciation and income
taxes, are figured separately as a component of the total revenue a utility can collect from its customers, a
company can increase its profits by increasing either the rate of return or the rate base. If actual expenses
exceed estimated expenses, less money will be available for dividends.
The amount of profit becomes just as relevant as the rate of profit to the evaluation of privately owned
utilities because investors in utilities often earn a return on capital provided by consumers. Thus, in determining
whether utility services are being provided at the lowest possible price, one must look not only to the rate of
profit as a percentage return on the rate base. One also must examine the absolute amount of profit to see
whether investors justifiably earn a return on capital provided by others, and whether any profit is justifiable in
economic terms or if it is unnecessary to the provision of utility services.
33. 1980 U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT U.S. no. 807, at 486. From May 1980 to
May 1981 the overall Consumer Price Index rose 9.8% and the price index for gas and electricity rose 13.9%.
1981 id. no. 780, at 467.
34. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP-T OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED
ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1980-CLASSES A AND B COMPANIES 35 (1981).
35. 1981 U.S. DEP-T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT U.S. no. 1021, at 592.
36. For example, the cost of uranium jumped from $6 to $40 a pound between 1973 and 1978. Scheff, A
Primer on the Energy Crisis, LAB. UNITY, August 1978, at 9, 9. The average hourly employee earnings (before
taxes) in the nonfarm business sector increased 75% between 1970 and 1980; the Consumer Price Index for gas
and electricity rose 110% during the same period. 1981 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
U.S. no. 677, at 405; id. no. 780, at 467.
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ephone companies regulated by the FCC rose over 160 percent between 1970
and 1980; 7 in comparison, the overall Consumer Price Index rose 79.6 per-
cent between those years.38 American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(A.T.&T.) and its principal telephone subsidiaries increased total dividends
declared, excluding intercompany dividends, by over 166 percent from 1970
to 1980.39 From 1971 to 1980 electric utility operating revenues less total
operating expenses 40 (including all taxes paid) increased over 274 percent; 4'
unappropriated retained earnings increased over 124 percent;42 dividends de-
clared on common stock increased over 184 percent; and dividends declared
on preferred stock increased more than 314 percent. 43 From 1970 to 1980 gas
utilities increased dividend payments a little more than 155 percent. 44
Increases in utility prices larger than increases in prices of other con-
sumer goods and services, accompanied by large increases in net income and
declared dividends, indicate that a lion's share of increased utility rates can be
attributed to private ownership. If the prices of labor and materials were the
sole cause of utility price increases, no money would be available for the large
increases in payments to stockholders. In fact, for a typical private utility,
about one-fifth of all revenues is kept as profit.45 Perhaps the most striking
demonstration of how regulated private utilities reap huge profits is
A.T.&T.'s February 2, 1982, announcement that its 1981 net income marked
the highest profit ever recorded by any company in the world. 46 "The com-
pany attributed its financial success to higher telephone rates. State and
federal regulators had allowed A.T.&T. rate hikes totalling $4.2 billion in
1981, compared with $2 billion in 1980." 47 Clearly, even when restrained by
regulation, private enterprise works, but for whom?
B. Rate Base Inflation
Since utility profits are determined by multiplying the rate base by the
rate of return, 48 a utility is advantaged by increasing the dollar amount of the
rate base. For example, if a utility has a choice between a plant that costs
three million dollars and two plants that each cost fifty million dollars, the
utility will benefit shareholders by choosing the two fifty million dollar plants.
37. 1981 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT U.S. no. 953, at 560.
38. 1980 id. no. 807, at 486.
39. 1981 id. no. 952, at 560.
40. Total Operating Expenses = Operation Expenses + Depreciation + Taxes. UTILITY RATEMAKING,
supra note 2, at 78.
41. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED
ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1980--CLASSES A AND B COMPANIES 8 (1981).
42. Id. at 32.
43. Id.
44. 1981 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT U.S. no. 1020, at 592.
45. Shorts, POWER LINE, August 1979, at 2.
46. A.T.&T.'s '81 Net is World Record, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1982, § IV, at 1, col. 3.
47. 42 FACTS ON FILE 231Al, no. 2159 (WORLD NEWS DIGEST) (April 2, 1982).
48. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Assuming a constant nine percent rate of return, a utility will earn nine million
dollars if it chooses the more expensive option, rather than two hundred and
seventy thousand dollars if it invests in the less expansionary and less expen-
sive alternative.49 The larger the rate base, the larger the profits.
The rate base increases with each addition of plant or equipment. These
additional assets are justified if they are necessary to improve services and to
meet customer demands. At a minimum, utilities generally are required to
provide adequate service to all patrons. For electric utilities this translates
into a requirement of reliability-the ability of a utility to meet demand at any
given time. 51 Most American utilities theoretically are designed on the as-
sumption of one generating outage of several minutes to several hours every
ten years.5 2 A system's reliability usually is measured by its reserve margin:
the excess of generating capacity over peak load demand.53 Since generating
capacity is considered a function of plant and equipment,54 the electric in-
dustry has tied the reliability of its service to its rate base. A congressional
study criticized this focus, noting that transmission and distribution system
breakdowns are responsible for more power failures than is insufficient
generating capacity.55 The study also pointed out that other factors which
contribute to reliable service often are ignored or discounted: regional inter-
connections of electric systems, technical improvements in the components
of power systems rather than parallel capacity, and the use of computers to
contain system problems by assessing and correcting complex malfunctions in
a shorter time than could humans.56
The primary element in planning for reliability is a projection ot
demand. 5 Greater demand necessitates greater generating capacity. The
demand projections of investor owned utilities are overstated consistently. 8
Utilities have admitted to being overly "optimistic" and have revised down-
ward their ten-year forecasts of average annual growth in peak demand by
over fifty-five percent since 1974.' 9 A congressional study on excess generat-
49. Since financing of construction can be achieved with a combination of ratepayer moneys and external
funds, the interest on which is borne by ratepayers, the size of the investment does not concern the shareholders
in this respect. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
50. W.K. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 288 (1976).
51. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., ARE THE ELECTRIC UTILITIES GOLD PLATED? A PERSPECTIVE ON
ELECTRIC UTILITY RELIABILITY 2 (1979).
52. Id. at 7.
53. Peak load demand is the demand for the maximum amount of electric power placed on the system at
any one time. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 229.
54. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ARE THE ELECTRIC UTILITIES GOLD PLATED? A PERSPECTIVE ON
ELECTRIC UTILITY RELIABILITY 21 (1979).
55. Id. at 19.
56. Id. at 20.
57. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 183.
58. NATIONAL AMERICAN ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY AND DEMAND
1982-1991, at 5 (1982).
59. Id.
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ing capacity noted that "[i]nasmuch as the utility industry generally perceives
overcapacity as a lesser evil than undercapacity, there is a tendency to inflate
future reserve margins in planning the growth of the systems as a hedge
against resumed growth." 60 While the difference between a 4.2 percent and a
7 percent projected annual growth in demand may seem small, it translates
into a highly significant 66 percent difference in generating capacity required
to meet that demand.6 '
Despite the tremendous cost of construction for additional capacity, util-
ities are loath to curtail their construction programs in line with ever lower
demand forecasts,62 in part because rate bases and subsequently profits are
inflated with every addition to generating capacity. If construction work in63
progress is included in rate bases, which permits use of consumer money in
lieu of stockholder money to finance construction, utilities have an added
incentive to overbuild.6'
And overbuilt they have. An eighteen to twenty percent reserve margin is
more than adequate for most electric utility systems. 65 A congressional study
noted that if average annual energy consumption grew at a maximum of five
percent from 1977 to 1986, and if virtually no new starts in plant construction
were made after 1979, no area of the country would have less than a twenty
percent reserve margin in 1986, and six would have twenty-five percent or
more. 66 The annual growth in electricity use dropped from 5.2 percent in 1977
to 3.9 percent in 1978 and leveled off to about 2 percent in 1979 and 1980.67
Utilities now are projecting an annual growth rate in peak demand of only 3.4
percent. 68 Nevertheless, they continue to plan and construct for additional
60. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS:, ARE THE ELECTRIC UTILITIES GOLD PLATED? A PERSPECTIVE ON
ELECTRIC UTILITY RELIABILITY 24 (1979).
61. The plant capacity planned to meet a 7% demand increase would mean a 66% increase over that
planned for a 4.2% demand growth since 7% is 66% larger than 4.2% and thus would require the equivalent
amount of increased capacity to meet the larger demand.
62. In 1979 projected average annual growth in peak demand dropped over 9.4% from the previous year's
projection. However, the utilities decreased their projections of new capacity by only about 7.3%. NATIONAL
AMERICAN ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1982-1991, at 5
(1982); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ADDITIONS TO GENERATING CAPACITY 1979-1988 FOR THE CONTIGUOUS
UNITED STATES 5 (1979).
63. Under this accounting method the value of incomplete construction is included in the rate base. The
shareholders thus earn a current return on plant not yet in service. See infra text accompanying note 99.
64. CONSUMERS OPPOSEDTO INFLATION INTHE NECESSITIES, THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES 35 (1979)
(Consumer group is based in Washington, D.C.).
65. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE &
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., ARE THE ELECTRIC UTILITIES GOLD PLATED? A PER-
SPECTIVE ON ELECTRIC UTILITY RELIABILITY (1979); Morris & Levin, Addressing the "Excess Capacity"
Issue, PUB. UTIL. FORT., March 12, 1981, at23 (argument of Ohio Public Utilities Commission staff); Navarro,
The Soft, Hard, or Smart Path: Charting the Electric Industry's Future, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 18, 1981, at
25, 26 (traditional rule of thumb is 20% maximum).
66. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., ARE THE ELECTRIC UTILITIES GOLD PLATED? A PERSPECTIVE ON
ELECTRIC UTILITY RELIABILITY 37 (1979).
67. 1980 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT U.S. no. 1042, at 610; Fourth Quarter
1980, 1981 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION AD. Q. REP.: ENERGY INFORMATION 3.
68. NATIONAL AMERICAN ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY AND DEMAND
1982-1991, at 5 (1982).
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capacity.69 A comparison of the actual figures for demand growth and plant
construction with the assumptions made in the congressional study implies
that by 1986 the country will be saddled with a large amount of excess capac-
ity.
The above summary relates to electric enterprises. The reasoning, how-
ever, applies to other utilities as well. As long as additions to rate base
increase profits, and as long as those additions and the profit concept remain
largely unquestioned by regulatory agencies and the courts, 70 rate bases will
be inflated and utility prices will skyrocket.
C. Tunnel-Vision Choice of Technology
Just as unnecessary additions to capacity inflate the rate base, so does
the choice of unduly capital-intensive technology. Unlike wages, which are
operation expenses, technology is part of the rate base and increases the value
of the assets on which shareholders earn returns.
Present regulatory processes not only provide little incentive for management to
economize on resources, but would seem systematically to encourage the prof-
ligate use of certain resources. Where returns are allowed on all capital in the rate
base-that is, all capital that is considered to be a functional part of the utility
plant-there is a temptation for management to inflate the capital base. Capital-
saving innovation would be shunned in favor of capital-using innovation.71
This choice has an impact on employment and capital allocation in our
economy. Two billion dollars invested in energy conservation and solar
power would provide four times as many jobs as would be provided if it were
invested in nuclear reactors. 72 The economics of nuclear power are so bad
that the environmental and safety arguments are fast becoming secondary. 7
Not only are construction costs higher than for coal-fired plants, but once
constructed, nuclear generators normally operate slightly more than half of
the time. 74 Cleanup costs for nuclear mishaps can be phenomenal. 75 Yet util-
69. U.S. DEP*T OF ENERGY, ADDITIONS TO GENERATING CAPACITY 1979-1988 FOR THE CON-
TIGUOUS UNITED STATES 3-5 (1979).
70. The Michigan Supreme Court recently ruled that state law does not provide for financing programs for
construction to be reviewed by considering whether new generating capacity is needed and any attempts to do
so were improper. Attorney Gen. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comn'n, 412 Mich. 385, 316 N.W.2d 187 (1982). See
also infra note 172.
71. Gies, The Need for New Concepts in Public Utility Regulation, in UTILITY REGULATION, NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 88, 97 (W. Shepherd & T. Gies ed. 1966).
72. R. GROSSMAN & G. DANEKER, ENERGY, JOBS AND THE ECONOMY 71 (1979). Not only does
nuclear power create fewer jobs, but those jobs it does create require highly skilled personnel. The ratio of
tradespeople to professional scientists or technicians is two to one for nuclear power, and nine to one forsolar
energy. Id.
73. Scheff, A Primer on the Energy Crisis, LAB. UNITY, August 1978, at 9, 10. See also Haines & Moyer,
"No Nukes" is Not Enough, PROGRESSIVE, March 1981, at 34.
74. See, e.g., New Plan Offered on 9-Mile A-Plant, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1982, at 43, col. 1 (overruns on
nuclear plant increased its cost over 10 times the amount originally projected when construction began in 1974);
A Record Rate Rise for Jersey Utility, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1982, at I, col. 5 (utility granted its largest rate
increase ever so that it could complete nuclear generating station; original cost estimate was $250 million, Board
of Public Utilities now estimates $3 billion); Rate Rise Granted Atlantic Electric, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1982, at
26, col. 6 (rate increase to cover costs of investment in and operation of nuclear power plant).
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ities favor nuclear technology for the same reason consumers oppose it:
nuclear technology is expensive and is a huge boost to the rate base and
consequently to utility profits.
76
Choice of technology-whether it relates to generating electricity or to
triggering telephone shut-off notices-involves societal and not solely stock-
holder interests. Cost efficiency, employment, capital allocation priorities,
quality of service, and quality of life all should be considered in the selection of
technology. Instead, because privately owned utilities have profit maximiza-
tion as their primary goal, the choice of technology often is dependent on how
the technology will affect the rate base.
D. Providing for the Poor
Regulation is said to be a substitute for competition. 77 Competition
theoretically lowers the prices of goods and services, yet does not place those
goods and services within the reach of the poor. As noted, one of the reasons
the state regulates utilities is because they are considered essential. 78 Since
this nation presumably has chosen to provide persons with the essentials of
life, what some call the safety net, 79 regulation should go beyond the imitation
of competitive capitalism. Although some commentators write of the distribu-
tive function of utility rates, 80 rate regulation has done an unsatisfactory job of
distributing services to those unable to pay the ever-increasing rates. Con-
cern about this problem peaked in 1978 and 1979, when consumer groups
across the country pressed for a ban on winter shut-offs of gas and electricity
using the slogan, "No One Should Freeze to Death Again. ' , 8' The major
arguments of utilities against a winter shut-off ban were that they would lose
too much money and that utilities are not social service agencies. a2 Instead,
utilities suggested that government foot the bill. 8'
Nuclear power plants in 1978 had a 55% average capacity factor (the ratio of the plant's actual annual
production to the production it would have achieved had it operated all year at full capacity). HOUSE COMM.
ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, H.R. REP. NO. 1090, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978).
75. The cost of decontaminating Three Mile Island is estimated at $1.1 billion, only $340 million of which is
covered by insurance. Three Mile Island Marks Third Year of Bad News, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1982, at 28,
col. 1. However, the federal government (hence the taxpayers) has agreed to remove and dispose of the most
dangerous portion of the contaminated reactor. U.S. Signs Pledge to Aid Three Mile Island Work, N.Y. Times,
April 8, 1982, at 16, col. 5.
76. Between 1970 and 1979 privately owned utilities increased their nuclear generating capacity by over
700%. 1980 U.S. DEP-T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT U.S. no. 1046, at 613.
77. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 93-94 (1961).
78. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
79. E.g., The Big Holes in the Safety Net, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1982, at A17, col. I.
,80. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 58-62 (1961); W.K. JONES, REGULATED
INDUSTRIES 77 (1976).
81. See, e.g., Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, Campaign on Utility Rate Reform (Oct. 12, 1978) (National
headquarters of the Coalition is in Washington, D.C.).
82. Telephone interviews with representatives of Public Service Electric & Gas Co., Hackensack, New
Jersey (Winter 1978-79).
83. The federal government responded favorably to utility suggestions and established the Low-Income
Energy Assistance Program to pay for some of the heating bills of low-income persons. State governments also
participated in programs to pay utility bills for low-income families. For example, in 1981 New York, with
moneys from the federal program, granted utilities an average of $180 per household. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982,
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Privately owned utilities act self interestedly. They will not provide ser-
vices voluntarily without a monetary return. The courts no doubt would find a
statute or commission order to provide services free of charge an unconstitu-
tional violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments' commands that pri-
vate property not be taken for public use without just compensation. 84 Since
the courts seem to regard dividends on stock as a cost that rates must cover to
be just and reasonable, 85 "mere" compensation for the expense of providing
the services-excluding the capital costs of equity ownership-would not
appear to fit the Constitution's criterion of just compensation as currently
interpreted.
The question then becomes whether it is rational for the government, and
therefore the public, to allocate money not only for the poor but also for utility
stockholders, in the form of a profit on services provided to the poor. An
alternative is public ownership, which would allow utilities to provide ser-
vices to the poor at a lower cost to all consumers. Granted, whether through
tax dollars or by raising other customers' rates, service to the poor must be
subsidized directly or indirectly by consumers. However, only the cost of
service, and not the cost of equity, need be paid to a publicly owned utility.
Since the added cost of profit is eliminated, government could cut its own
costs without cutting services.
Ill. PUBLIC UTILITY FINANCING AND THE MISSING
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
The significant service and price problems inherent in the private owner-
ship of utilities8 6 lead one to question the traditional justifications for private
ownership. Typical justifications are the following: (1) stockholders provide
the necessary capital for investment and expansion, (2) private ownership
more efficiently allocates available resources, and any inefficiency caused by
the utilities' monopoly position can be controlled through regulation, 8 and (3)
at 46, col. 1. See also Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 14, 1982, at 4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1981, at 10, col. 5; N.Y.
Times, April 26, 1981, § XI, at 26, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1981, § II, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1980,
at 1, col. 3.
84. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (rates must provide for
a fair rate of return). This, of course, assumes that the rates of other consumers will not be raised to pay for the
services provided free to the poor.
85. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923).
86. Increased profits are an incentive to raise rates, to overexpand, and to choose capital-intensive tech-
nology. Whatever shortcomings, such as inaccurate demand forecasting, publicly owned utilities share with
investor owned utilities, publicly owned utilities lack the profit orientation that makes certain conduct appeal-
ing. Furthermore, regulation cannot ensure that utility services will be provided at the lowest possible cost to
the public because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as mandating a fair rate of return to utility
investors. Thus, cost of equity prevents regulators from lowering utility prices to their bare minimum-actual
cost of service. If cost of equity was eliminated from rates, investors would abandon private ownership of
utilities. Without the opportunity to profit from their investments, rational capitalists withhold their capital.
87. C. SNYDER, CAPITALISM THE CREATOR 121-22 (1940); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 48 (8th ed.
1970).
88. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 602 (8th ed. 1970).
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privately owned business operates in the best interests of not only share-
holders, but their customers and communities.8 9
In examining these justifications, this Comment will analyze various
methods of financing utility construction to determine whether stockholders
are providing the capital on which they earn returns. Since profit is a return to
shareholders and creditors on investment, it is logical to focus on rate-setting
techniques that determine who provides capital for investment to ascertain
whether shareholders are justified in earning profits and whether the share-
holders are necessary to utility operation. Judicial, administrative, and legis-
lative responses to the use of construction work in progress and alternate
ratemaking techniques will be examined to determine whether stockholders
are providing capital in a way that yields an efficient allocation of resources in
the public interest.
A. The Relationship Between Financing Methods and Rates
The manner in which a utility finances its construction is reflected in the
rates it charges. For example, if debt is incurred to finance construction, this
capital cost will be reflected in the amount of the rate of return. 9° Each
granted request for money to finance new construction projects entails an-
other rate increase. Rate increases are determined in the following manner.
Step 1. A test year is chosen, usually the year immediately preceding the
rate request. 91 Total operating expenses 92 are calculated from the year's
operating expenses adjusted for unusual occurrences and foreseeable devia-
tions from test-year expenses. 93 For example, if the utility is expanding its
service territory, expenses will be increased to account for the additional
costs of billing and maintenance. The regulatory agency then determines what
property is included in the rate base and sets a dollar value for that rate base. 94
It also determines a fair rate of return for investors in the utility. 95 The rate
base is multiplied by the rate of return, and this amount is added to total
operating expenses to arrive at the total revenues of the company. In equation
form:
Total Revenue = (Rate Base x Rate of Return) + Operation
Expenses + Taxes + Depreciation.
96
89. Id. at 601; see also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OFTHE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (Modem Library ed. 1937).
90. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
91. One definition ofa test year is any 12-month period used by a regulatory commission to evalute the rate
base, depreciation, taxes, and operating expenses of a utility. It may be the most recent 12 months, the most
recent calendar year, or some combination of past and future months. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at
221.
92. Total Operating Expenses = Operation Expenses + Depreciation + Taxes. Id. at 61, 77.
93. E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 127 (1950). See generally J. BRYANT & R.
HERRMANN, ELEMENTS OF UTILITY RATE DETERMINATION 191-213 (1940).
94. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 52.
95. Id. at 53.
96. Id. at 57.
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Step 2. Total revenue, the total amount of money a utility is authorized to
collect from its customers, is compared with the total income the company
would receive under its present rates. Total income is subtracted from the
total revenue figure determined in step one to arrive at the revenue require-
ment or revenue deficiency of the company. 97 Total Revenue - Total Income
= Revenue Deficiency. This revenue deficiency is the amount of the rate
hike. 9
B. Construction Work in Progress with and Without Offset to Income
One method of financing construction is through the placement of con-
struction work in progress in the rate base. Construction Work in Progress
(CWIP) represents facilities that are incomplete and not yet in service.
Regulatory agencies usually treat it in one of two ways. One way is to include
CWIP in the rate base and to permit utilities to receive income on plant not yet
operational. This method allows companies to recover the costs of capital
invested in construction work before the new facilities provide any service. 99
The other way, generally followed by FERC and by some states,1'00 allows
CWIP in the rate base but offsets it by including in income funds used during
construction. This is called allowance for funds used during construction
(AFUDC). It is determined by multiplying CWIP by a percentage that is
meant to reflect capital costs as determined by the regulatory agency. The
AFUDC is counted as an income item and, therefore, is subtracted from the
total revenue requirement, effectively offsetting the return on CWIP.'0 '
On the company's balance sheet a percentage of CWIP may be main-
tained as a separate asset account. This account denotes the return privately
owned utilities must pay on long-term assets.'0 2 This AFUDC account,
though treated as income, is a noncash item.' 03 The amounts allowed are
added to the cost of work in progress each year until the plant is placed in
service, at which time both CWIP and AFUDC become part of the rate
97. J. BAUER, UPDATING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 1 (1966).
98. See L. NASH, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 120 (2d ed. 1931). See generally E.
CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 52 (1950); C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
129-31 (1969).
99. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PRO-
GRESS ISSUE NEEDS IMPROVED REGULATORY RESPONSE FOR UTILITIES AND CONSUMERS at ii (1980).
100. E.g., Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Wis-
consin, Wyoming. Chart of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, at 416 (1979) (The
Association is based in Washington, D.C.).
101. P. RODGERS, J. EDWARD SMITH, JR. & R. PROFOZICH, CURRENT ISSUES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY
RATE SETTING 65, 70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CURRENT ISSUES].
In determining the amount of a rate hike, total income is subtracted from a new determination of total
revenue based on the test year. Total Revenue - Total Income = Revenue Deficiency (Rate Hike). Any
increase in rate base, e.g., CWIP, increases the total revenue determination, and so increases the rate hike. Any
increase in total income, e.g., AFUDC, will decrease the amount that is granted as a rate hike.
102. Joskow, Financing the Future Growth of the Electric Power Industry, in PROCEEDINGS OF WORK-
SHOP ON ELECTRIC UTILITY FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 58 (M. Kahn ed. 1976).
103. Noncash income, of course, will not improve a company's cash flow. Companies that need cash on
hand to meet expenses will want the immediate return of CWIP, rather than the noncash income of AFUDC.
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base.'o4 The accumulated interest (AFUDC) thus increases the asset value of
the plant,' 05 allowing the utility to earn a return not only on the asset itself, but
on the capital costs of producing the asset.
1. The Case for a Current Return on Construction Work in Progress '6
The utility industry is facing severe financial difficulties in attracting the
capital to maintain construction programs to meet future service demands. 07
In the early 1960s electric utilities financed about forty percent of their plant
expansion through outside lending markets. By 1980 that figure had advanced
to two-thirds of plant expansion. 108 The rising cost and difficulty of attracting
new capital is attributed to the longer time between the expenditure and the
cost recovery and to the lower quality of utility earnings that result from the
inclusion of AFUDC in the rate base. 109 Since AFUDC is a noncash item,
stockholders and investors are unwilling to recognize AFUDC as earnings.
Stock prices fall and interest rates rise when the utilities experience cash-flow
problems, because they theoretically have less cash on hand to distribute as
dividends or to ensure that interest payments are met.' 10
Utilities also claim that although they are forced to meet service obliga-
tions, they are not permitted to earn a return on the capital tied up in construc-
tion to meet those obligations. Courts approving the inclusion of CWIP in the
rate base cite this type of reasoning. "
Since utilities attempt to maximize the amount of investment on which a
current return will be received, the use of AFUDC creates a bias against
capital-intensive technology. If the utilities' claim that capital-intensive tech-
nologies are efficient and provide cost savings to consumers is accepted," 2
this bias is seen as resulting in higher overall rates.
Likewise, the use of AFUDC increases utility rates more than CWIP
104. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 65.
105. Joskow, Financing the Future Growth of the Electric Power Industry, in PROCEEDINGS OF WORK-
SHOP ON ELECTRIC UTILITY FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 56 (M. Kahn ed. 1976).
106. The author does not support the proposition that Construction Work in Progress should be included in
the rate base.
107. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 71. Utilities, however, overproject growth in demand, which
results in unnecessary construction. See supra text accompanying notes 57-69.
108. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 184.
109. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 186; CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 71-76. But see
supra text accompanying notes 39-44 (statistics on dividends).
110. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 186; CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 71-76.
i1. E.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 380 A.2d 126, 157 (D.C. 1978) (Yeagley, J.,
dissenting), rev'd on rehearing, 402 A.2d 14 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
112. E.g., C. LUCE, 155 YEARS OF TECHNOLOGICAL EXCELLENCE 17-18, 20-21 (1979) (author was
chairperson and chief executive officer of Consolidated Edison Company of New York). The claim that capital-
intensive technology, particularly nuclear power, is cost efficient seems incredible in light of the known costs of
this technology. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76. For example, Long Island Light Company (LILCO)
started an advertising campaign, with a potential price tag of $800,000, espousing the benefits of nuclear power.
The campaign emphasized reduced reliance on foreign oil, not lower electric bills. The public relations campaign
began after LILCO was found to have the second highest electric rates in the country and after Suffolk County
authorized a public takeover feasibility study. N.Y. Times, April 19, 1982, § II, at 2, col. 1.
113. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 187.
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without offset because it capitalizes the cost of raising money (i.e., the inter-
est and dividends associated with the construction work " 4). The interest and
dividends, in addition to the plant itself, become part of the utility's rate base
while the plant is in service. 15 CWIP without offset is removed from the rate
base when the plant is placed in service: the cost of raising money is no longer
part of the plant valuation. Since a plant usually is in service longer than the
time it takes to build it, the shareholders earn a return on capital costs for,
say, thirty-five years under AFUDC, rather than ten years under straight
CWIP. "6 For example, if PC is the cost of the plant itself and KC is the cost of
capital associated with the plant, straight CWIP can be expressed as (10 x
KC) + (35 x PC x rate of return), in which 10 is the number of years for
construction and 35 is the useful life of the plant. AFUDC can be expressed as
35 x (PC + KC) x rate of return. In both cases the amount included in the
rate base-PC or (PC + KC)-is amortized over the life of the plant. '17 CWIP
provides an early return on capital and a smaller return once the plant is in
use; AFUDC provides a postponed and larger return once the plant is in
service.
Supporters of straight CWIP also claim that since investors prefer CWIP
without offset, investors are willing to provide money to a utility with straight
CWIP at lower rates, thereby presenting another cost savings to customers. 118
2. The Case Against Construction Work in Progress Without Offset
CWIP provides money to a utility by increasing earnings, which are
subject to income tax. Revenues collected from customers are increased to
include taxes for which the utility is liable. "9 CWIP thus requires customers
to contribute two dollars for every one dollar made available for construction
purposes: one dollar for taxes, one dollar for construction. 20 This process
may be contrasted to the raising of capital through the sale of securities: every
dollar raised is equal to one dollar available for construction. 21
114. Legislative Util. Consumers' Council v. Public Serv. Co., 119 N.H. 332,336,402 A.2d 626,629 (1979).
115. As the cost of the plant allocated to rate base is reduced through depreciation, so the amount of
interest and dividends in the rate base associated with that plant is reduced as the years progress.
116. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 73.
117. Id. at 65.
118. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 54.
119. Id. at 65. Total Revenue = (Rate Base x Rate of Return) + Operation Expenses + Depreciation +
Taxes.
To the extent that income taxes are considered by commissions as ordinary business expenses and
hence included in [Total Operating Expenses], regulated industry investors receive preferential treat-
ment. In unregulated industries, income taxes are taken from the total earnings of a company after
ordinary costs of doing business are accounted for.
When income taxes are treated as costs, an automatically increasing spiral is built into utility rates.
Higher rates due to taxes bring higher earnings, which bring higher taxes, which raise costs again.
Id. at 72.
120. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 88.
121. Id. at 90. Of course, these dollars carry with them the future obligation of interest payments or
dividends.
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A second argument against straight CWIP is that it forces present rate-
payers to pay for facilities they may never use because of their own relocation
or death, or the cancellation of the plant. 12 CWIP violates intergeneration
equity, 123 which posits that current ratepayers should pay only for the cost of
service attributable to them, not that cost attributable to future ratepayers.
"Used and useful" is a similar concept. Most states provide that prop-
erty to be included in the rate base on which shareholders may earn a return
must be "used and useful" in the public service 12 4 or "used or required to be
used" in a utility's services to the public.5 Construction work in progress is
not used by or useful to current ratepayers. Courts that agree with state
regulatory commission decisions to include CWIP in the rate base extend the
concept of used and useful to include the public's interest in the utility at-
tracting capital to meet increased demands for improved services. 126 These
courts also note that property held for future use is allowed in the rate base.' 27
Courts that agree with commission exclusion of CWIP use a more literal
definition of used and useful and of the public interest.'
8
The liberal interpretation of used and useful that accompanies CWIP
permits utilities more leeway in construction decisions. CWIP without offset
encourages utilities to overexpand. Each new construction program increases
the rate base and thus increases utility earnings. 2 9 Because of the promise of
immediate returns on CWIP, utilities have an incentive to inflate demand
projections 30 and no incentive to pursue conservation programs to reduce
capital needs, 131 to repair present plant facilities, 132 to improve technology of
122. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PRO-
GRESS ISSUE NEEDS IMPROVED REGULATORY RESPONSE FOR UTILITIES AND CONSUMERS 54 (1980);
CONSUMERS OPPOSED TO INFLATION IN THE NECESSITIES, THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES 35 (1979) (Con-
sumer group is based in Washington, D.C.).
123. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PRO-
GRESS ISSUE NEEDS IMPROVED REGULATORY RESPONSE FOR UTILITIES AND CONSUMERS 52 (1980).
124. See, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 231 Ga. 339,343,201 S.E.2d 423,426-27
(1973).
125. See, e.g., Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 4 Kan. App. 2d 674, 677, 610
P.2d 121, 124 (1980).
126. See, e.g., Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 310 N.W.2d 686 (Minn.
1981); Legislative Util. Consumers' Council v. Public Serv. Co., 119 N.H. 332, 344, 402 A.2d 626,634 (1979).
127. See, e.g., Legislative Util. Consumers' Council v. Public Serv. Co., 119 N.H. 332, 343,402 A.2d 626,
633 (1979).
128. See, e.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 116 R.I. 356, 386-87, 358 A.2d 11, 19
(1976) ("Property under construction is clearly not used in the rendering of regulated services .... ). Accord
Lafourche Tel. Co. v. Lousiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 367 So. 2d 1174, 1177 (La. 1979) (CWIP could not be
included in the rate base to compensate for attrition or to offset the costs of inflation and court delays); Office of
Consumers' Counsel v. Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, 58 Ohio St. 2d 449, 391 N.E.2d 311 (1979).
129. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
130. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PRO-
GRESS ISSUE NEEDS IMPROVED REGULATORY RESPONSE FOR UTILITIES AND CONSUMERS 52 (1980).
131. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 189, 190; CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 83.
132. The cost of maintenance is an operating expense account. Uniform System of Accounts for Public
Utilities and Licensees Subject to the Provisions of the Federal Power Act (Class A and Class B), 18 C.F.R.
§ 101 (1981); Uniform System of Accounts for Public Utilities and Licensees Subject to the Provisions of the
Federal Power Act (Class C and Class D), 18 C.F.R. § 104 (1981); Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for
Natural Gas Companies Subject to the Provisions of the Natural Gas Act (Class A and Class B), 18 C.F.R. § 201
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providing services, or to increase the efficient use of present capacity. 133 This
tendency is highly inflationary and diverts resources from other sectors of the
economy. 1
34
CWIP diverts investment from labor-intensive to capital-intensive tech-
nology, such as nuclear power with its drawbacks in efficiency, impact on
employment, and overall cost. 135 The more expensive the plant, the larger the
rate base, and the larger the earnings. 1
36
The larger earnings promised by CWIP encourage inefficiency. Since
shareholders are allowed a return on investment on any construction work in
progress, little incentive exists to avoid projects witli long lead times or to
complete construction quickly. 1
37
CWIP also forces customers to bail out management incompetence,
whereas customers need not pay AFUDC on funds invested incompetently. 
38
For example, in one case a utility cancelled its plan for a nuclear power plant
when it discovered that the proposed site was within two thousand feet of an
earthquake fault. 139 The utility already had spent over two million dollars on
engineering studies and had accumulated approximately three hundred thou-
sand dollars of AFUDC. '40 The court held that the three hundred thousand
dollars of AFUDC was not to be amortized, reasoning that the AFUDC
represented carrying costs borne by the investor in a project never to be used
or useful. ' 4' If CWIP had been allowed the customers already would have paid
those costs relegated to the investor by the court. CWIP thus shifts the risk of
investment from shareholders and bondholders to ratepayers. '
42
Utility customers may wonder why they are required to make interest-
free advances to utilities for projects so risky that shareholders refuse to
assume the risk. Ratepayers also may question whether the rate of return
should be lowered drastically when CWIP without offset is included in the
(1981); Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Natural Gas Companies Subject to the Provisions of the
Natural Gas Act (Class C and Class D), 18 C.F.R. § 204 (1981); Uniform System of Accounts for Class A and
Class B Telephone Companies, 47 C.F.R. § 31.602 (1981); Uniform System of Accounts for Class C Telephone
Companies, 47 C.F.R. §§ 33.4010-.4090 (1981).
133. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 190; Just, Overview of Electric Utility Financial Problems-
Long Run Versus Short Run, in PROCEEDINGS OF WORKSHOP ON ELECTRIC UTILITY FINANCIAL PROB-
LEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 17 (M. Kahn ed. 1976).
134. CONSUMERS OPPOSED TO INFLATION IN THE NECESSITIES, THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES 35
(1979) (Consumer group based in Washington, D.C.).
135. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 83.
136. See supra notes 31 & 76 and accompanying text.
137. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 87.
138. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PRO-
GRESS ISSUE NEEDS IMPROVED REGULATORY RESPONSE FOR UTILITIES AND CONSUMERS 53 (1980).
139. Central Me. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 433 A.2d 331, 344 (Me. 1981).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 94; see, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. National Fuel
Gas Distrib. Corp., 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 101, 108-09 (Pa. P.U.C. 1980) (commission excluded cost of
exploration program from rate base since it was not used and useful; commission noted that since it permitted
the amortization of exploration program costs, the result was a sharing of the risk between ratepayers and
shareholders).
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rate base. Since the cost of capital supposedly is related directly to risk, 43
CWIP puts investors in a no-risk situation that would justify limiting the
return on their capital to a minimum.
C. Alternatives to Standard CWIP and AFUDC
Other methods may provide utilities with the necessary cash flow and
capital for construction. The investment tax credit' 44 and accelerated de-
preciation, 145 in effect, are federal subsidies of construction. Most regulatory
commissions do not allow these tax benefits to flow through; for example,
they do not subtract the benefits from estimated taxes when determining
rates.'46 Instead, commissions normalize these tax breaks by adjusting the
rate base over the life of the asset or by establishing a reserve. 147 Ratepayers
rarely see any reduction in rates.', New investments and consequent depre-
ciation confer larger tax benefits on utilities each year, thus cancelling any
potential for belated rate-base relief. Customers are charged for taxes that
utilities never pay. 149 These taxes appropriately have been nicknamed "phan-
tom taxes." 150 Like CWIP, both these provisions encourage capital-intensive
resource allocation.
Regulatory agencies can increase the rate of return, which is the weighted
average of equity and long-term debt. The effects of and objections to this
financial device practically are identical to those of CWIP without offset. '51
Utilities have the same incentive to inflate the rate base on which they will be
earning returns at a higher rate. The tax consequences of CWIP also are
duplicated. Since a higher rate of return increases taxable earnings, rate-
payers must contribute more to achieve the desired effect.
143. Bronner, Alternatives to the Discounted Cash Flow Method in Determining the Cost of Common
Equity Capital, 1978 NARUC BIENNIAL REGULATORY INFORMATION CONF. at A-38.
144. I.R.C. § 38 (1976). This section permits a corporation to subtract from its tax liability a specified
percentage of investment in certain depreciable property.
145. I.R.C. § 167 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Depreciation, an allowance for wear and tear, exhaustion, or
obsolescence of property used in business, is deducted under § 167 from gross or taxable income. Accelerated
depreciation, which is specifically provided for in this section, is a depreciation method by which a larger
deduction for depreciation is taken at the beginning of the property's useful life than toward the later years of its
life. Thus, accelerated depreciation gives the taxpayer larger early deductions than the straight-line method,
which spreads annual depreciation deductions evenly over the life of the plant. The larger deductions from gross
income mean less taxable income, and consequently, a lower tax liability. Companies usually will want to
decrease tax liability immediately and pay taxes later-not only will they have the money in hand to invest until
the tax becomes due, but the overall tax liability will be smaller because inflation will decrease the value of the
dollars with which they pay that tax liability.
146. 2 P. Gerhart, Cases and Materials on Public Utilities Regulation 1 (1982) (unpublished manuscript).
147. See, e.g., In re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 29,34 (N.H.P.U.C. 1980)
(telephone company required to deduct pre-1971 investment tax credit reserve from its rate base; the portion of
the accumulated investment tax credit that had not been restored to income was available for general corporate
purposes and represented to the company customer-supplied cost-free capital).
148. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 109.
149. Id.
150. See R. MORGAN, PHANTOM TAXES IN YOUR ELECTRIC BILL (1976) (published by the Environ-
mental Action Foundation, Washington, D.C.).
151. CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 95-97.
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A second regulatory option is to allow CWIP in the rate base, but to treat
it as an enforced advance payment from customers for the purposes of con-
struction and improvement of cash flow. Customers are recognized nominally
as lending money to the utility. The money is segregated in an account called
Customer Advances for Construction, subject to refund within a reasonable
period of time. These funds never are credited to retained earnings, thereby
eliminating the income tax two-to-one dollar ratio problem.52 This method
has some of the same questionable characteristics as straight CWIP: for ex-
ample, the lack of incentive to conserve resources.
Customer Advances for Construction raises two serious questions similar
to those raised by Contributions in Aid of Construction, whereby customers
pay for the asset, not for the capital cost. 5 3 For nonrefundable Contributions
in Aid of Construction, the question is whether shareholders ever should
receive a return on that portion of company property for which customers
provided the capital. And for both Contributions in Aid of Construction and
Customer Advances for Construction, the question is whether customers
should receive a return on their capital over the life of the property in the
former case or until the loan is repaid in the latter case. These questions
automatically would be answered in the affirmative if shareholders or volun-
tary investors provided the capital for construction.
D. The Problematic Nature of Financing Construction for Privately Owned
Utilities
Whatever method is used to finance construction, the ultimate purpose is
to increase prices so utilities will have the money to finance construction
programs.' 54 In this sense, customers are forced investors. Without customer
capital contributions utilities claim they are unable to attract new capital or to
obtain capital at reasonable rates. 155 Ratepayers provide capital for construc-
tion through increased rates of return, taxes, advance payments, direct con-
tributions, CWIP, or AFUDC; yet shareholders earn a return on the com-
pleted plant. Since customers are receiving no return on their money, rate-
payers in effect are loaning the companies money, interest free! Because
Contributions in Aid of Construction and Customer Advances for Construc-
tion nominally recognize the role that customers are playing, they are more
honest, though not necessarily more desirable, methods of categorizing
customer payments than CWIP or increasing the rate of return.
152. Id. at 92. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
153. Gunter, Regulatory Treatment of Contributions-In-Aid-Of-Construction: Florida's Experience, 1980
NARUC BIENNIAL REGULATORY INFORMATION CONF. 402.
154. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PRO-
GRESS ISSUE NEEDS IMPROVED REGULATORY RESPONSE FOR UTILITIES AND CONSUMERS at ii (1980);
Joskow, Financing the Future Growth of the Electric Power Industry, in PROCEEDINGS OF WORKSHOP ON
ELECTRIC UTILITY FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 75 (M. Kahn ed. 1976).
155. E.g., Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 276 S.E.2d 179, 180 (W. Va. 1981) (utility
claimed new rates made it impossible for the company to secure needed investment capital).
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Some studies observe that the cost of capital is the same whether CWIP
or AFUDC is used. 156 According to these studies, the question is one of
timing: when will the ratepayers bear the cost of capital? However, the addi-
tional questions of who should bear the cost of capital, whether capital should
earn a return at all, and if so, under what circumstances, need to be ad-
dressed.
AFUDC helps to crystallize the issues surrounding the cost of capital. In
an attempt to describe and to justify the cost of capital and its treatment as
AFUDC, one court stated that "the cost of capital... may be said to have
two components. The first, an interest component, would be explicit interest
on borrowed funds. The second, an equity component, would be the return
that is 'foregone' when capital passes into ongoing construction work rather
than into alternative investments." 157
As a policy matter, the interest component apparently could be dealt with
as a charge-off to expenses as it became due, rather than as a component of
the rate of return or rate base. This method would eliminate the capitalization
of interest. Consumers then would pay only the interest itself, the profit on
interest allowed by AFUDC having been eliminated. Debt securities, unlike
equity, are contractual, and their price is fixed.' 58 Regulatory commissions,
therefore, would be able to determine total operating expenses with reason-
able certainty.
Instead, AFUDC places interest charges in the rate base as part of the
asset cost to which it is attributable. Shareholder returns are enlarged un-
necessarily because interest payments increase the rate base over the life of
the property, even after the interest has been paid. Thus, no incentive exists
to shop for willing buyers of debt securities with lower interest rates. 159
Bonds and other long-term debt instruments have no equity component,
the second part of the cost of capital. Yet AFUDC treats debt as if it had an
equity component because shareholders earn a return on interest payments.
Consumers, by paying the interest through operating expenses, could limit
compensation for the use of money to bondholders. Shareholders need not be
a party to the arrangement. Shareholders should not anticipate any return on
capital they did not provide or on a completed project they did not fund.
Justifications for the AFUDC treatment of interest are subject to serious
156. E.g., Weaver & Cone, Regulatory Considerations for Removal ofAFUDC, 1978 NARUC BIENNIAL
REGULATORY INFORMATION CONF. at A-63 to A-64.
157. Central Me. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 433 A.2d 331, 342 (1982).
158. Fairchild & Avera, Some Thoughts on the Rate of Return to Public Utility Companies, 1978 NARUC
BIENNIAL REGULATORY INFORMATION CONF. at A-31.
159. There is little incentive for this shopping around even if interest payments are part of operating
expenses. Utility commissions rarely scrutinize utility expenses and will accept utility figures if the expenses do
not appear absurd. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1057
(Utah 1981) ("To a large extent the statutory scheme places responsibility for proposing rates with the utility.
Within the limitations imposed by the Public Utility Act and the general policies of the Commission, manage-
ment decisions are generally accorded some deference, since management is most intimately involved in operat-
ing the utility .... ").
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criticism. The traditional rationale behind capitalizing AFUDC is twofold: (1)
the accounting definition of an asset is an unexpired cost chargeable to future
revenues, 60 and (2) if the return on investment is deferred, the deferred part
should earn a return.'
61
Regarding the first rationale, accounting concepts need not be definitive
of legal policy. Even in a state that had adopted the Uniform System of
Accounts, 62 the accounting profession's choice of accounting method was
held not to control the regulatory commission. 163 The court found that the
accounting concept of matching costs to the period in which they produced
revenues elevated form over substance. 164 The same may be said of the char-
acterization of interest as falling within the definition of asset: as an artificial
accounting precept, it may not fit a particular situation or be designed to
achieve what a utility commission considers to be an important policy goal.
The second rationale for capitalizing AFUDC-that the deferred return
itself should earn a return-seems to have little justification. If long-term debt
interest were treated as an operating expense, this rationale would be in-
applicable to external funds; creditors would be compensated as interest be-
came due.' 65 When the shareholders themselves provide the capital for con-
struction-either from a new issuance of stock or from profits or retained
earnings '66-the capitalization of AFUDC is equally unjustifiable. If capital is
viewed as a productive element, like labor, materials, and land,' 67 then return
on capital or profit may be viewed as the price of capital, just as wages are
160. For example, inventories, prepaid expenses, plant, and deferred charges are assets. These items will
be or have been paid; the cost is unexpired to the extent that the item will produce future revenues for the
company. In contrast, expired costs will not produce future revenues and are deducted from current revenues or
charged against retained earnings. Expired costs include current expenses and the costs of products disposed of
or sold. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 5024
(1981).
161. Weaver & Cone, Regulatory Considerations for Removal of AFUDC, 1978 NARUC BIENNIAL
REGULATORY INFORMATION CONF. at A-63.
162. 18 C.F.R. §§ 101, 104, 201, 204 (1981); 47 C.F.R. §§ 31.602, 33.4010-.4090 (1981).
163. Legislative Util. Consumers' Council v. Public Serv. Co., 119 N.H. 332, 347, 402 A.2d 626, 636-37
(1979) (commission properly rejected accounting method of matching costs to the revenues that the costs
produce).
164. Id. at 347, 402 A.2d at 636. The accounting profession capitalizes interest costs for the period required
to bring an asset to a condition ready for use or sale. With the exception of routinely manufactured inventories,
interest costs attributable to readying the asset for use are included in the cost (basis) of the asset. FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 1197-211 (1981). This Comment
argues that capitalizing interest is neither beneficial to ratepayers nor an accurate reflection of the nature of
interest costs of utilities. The accounting profession has recognized that its prescribed methods are not always
suitable for varying purposes. "Accounting information ... purports to reflect the activities of a particular
enterprise .... Information that is representationally faithful in the context for which it was designed, there-
fore, may not be reliable when used in other contexts." Id. at 3059-60.
165. See supra text accompanying note 158.
166. The assumption here is that CWIP is excluded from the rate base. Otherwise, the argument that
customers are making a capital contribution on which shareholders should earn no return would apply. Depre-
ciation is an expense item, directly recoverable from customers, and thus assumed not to be capital that
shareholders provide or on which shareholders should earn a return even if used to cover some construction
costs.
167. Fairchild & Avera, Some Thoughts on the Rate of Return to Public Utility Companies, 1978 NARUC
BIENNIAL REGULATORY INFORMATION CONF. at A-31.
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viewed as the price of labor. AFUDC suggests that profit itself should earn a
profit because the first profit was not taken immediately. This process is like a
demand, under threat of an ongoing surcharge, for payment prior to delivery
of materials, or in some cases, even before any guarantee of delivery is made.
(Power plant construction frequently is cancelled. I6) Furthermore, because
AFUDC exists for the life of the plant, shareholders earn a return on their
profit for a period exceeding the construction period during which earnings
were deferred. They in effect are being paid for work never performed.
The main conceptual problem with placing capital costs in the rate base is
that such placement allows utility investors to do something of questionable
validity even under capitalism: collect double, or excess, profit. Whether
analyzed under a theory of abstinence or risk bearing 69 or under a theory of
surplus value, 170 this excess profit is troublesome.
Under the theory of abstinence investors are assumed to be aware when
committing funds to a particular venture that other investments and returns
are being foregone. Further, they are aware that returns may not be im-
mediate, but, for various reasons, are willing to wait to realize a profit. If the
method of treating construction costs is public knowledge, investors should
be satisfied with the return allowed if they choose to invest. They may calcu-
late foregone gains in determining what rate of profit they will accept, but they
should not expect to collect that profit twice on a single investment. This
double collection of profit is the result when utility shareholders receive pro-
fits not only on the rate base or product of investment, but also on the
deferred profits.
Under risk-bearing theory profit is viewed as a reward for the share-
holder's risk bearing. Utility shareholders should be willing to defer this re-
ward since so few risks exist in a public utility. 171 Short of an obviously absurd
investment,'72 the Supreme Court has mandated that utility shareholders be
168. Platt, Some Implications of Cancelled Construction Plans, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 19, 1982, at 26;
N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1982, § IV, at 13 col. 1 (in the last 6 years, 91 nuclear and coal-fired plants were
cancelled); tee, e.g., Ex rel Gulf States Util. Co., 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 593 (La. P.U.C. 1980); Central
Me. Power-Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 433 A.2d 331 (Me. 1981); Fendell, Rate Hike, Aquarian, June 1979, at 6,
col. I (Public Service Electric & Gas Company's cancellation of plans for floating nuclear power plants off the
New Jersey coast).
169. Abstinence theory defines profit as the reward for postponing present enjoyment of wealth so that it
may be devoted to production. J. MOORE, W. STEINER, H. ARKIN & R. COLTON, MODERN ECONOMICS:
ITS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 355 (1940). Under risk-bearing theory profit is the reward for risking one's
investment when conditions of uncertainty exist. When the risk is greater, borrowers must pay a premium for
risk-taking large enough to cover possible losses. Id.; 2 W. KING, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF BUSI-
NESS 130-31 (W. Spahr ed. 1932); F. GARVER & A. HANSEN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 502-05 (1928).
170. Surplus-value theory defines profit as the difference between the wages paid to workers and the value
of the commodity produced by those workers. The value of the commodity is the amount of socially necessary
labor embodied in it. 2 P. GEMMILL & R. BLODGETr, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 431(1944).
171. Boulding, Social Risk, Political Uncertainty, and the Legitimacy of Private Profit, in RISK AND
REGULATED FIRMS 89-90 (R. Howard ed. 1973).
172. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1057 (Utah
1981); see also In re Boston Edison Co., 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 67, 89-91, 93 (Mass. P.U.C. 1980)
(attorney general objected to rate increase because of utility mismanagement and operating inefficiency;
commission, questioning the expert nature and impartiality of attorney general's witness and noting the efficien-
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provided a fair rate of return on investment. 73 The first profit may be viewed
as a risk-bearing reward; the second "profit" may be viewed as rent-always
the least defensible form of nonlabor income. 74
This double dipping by shareholders also may be analyzed under a theory
of surplus value. The shareholder, as owner and employer of capital, is asking
not only that he or she retain all the profit or surplus value produced by
employing the capital in the reproduction process. 175 The shareholder is at-
tempting to sell that same capital again to himself or herself, without alienat-
ing it and without reemploying it in the reproduction process, so it can pro-
duce a second surplus value or profit. Money can only produce more money if
it performs a productive function. 76 Whether characterized as rent, an un-
earned reward for risk bearing, or simply a greedy request for two profits
when a single investment realistically can produce only one, the capitalization
of AFUDC places unjustifiable financial burdens on ratepayers.
The unsatisfactory nature of AFUDC is mirrored in all the methods of
financing construction for privately owned utilities; investors benefit at the
consumers' expense. This Comment has suggested that both CWIP without
offset and AFUDC are unsatisfactory for funding construction programs. An
increase in the rate of return is particularly hard to justify given the increases
in dividend payments and residential bills mentioned earlier in this
Comment. "7 Contributions in Aid of Construction and Customer Advances
for Construction are equitable only if stockholders are not permitted to par-
ticipate in the fruits of ratepayer investment and if some provision is made to
allow ratepayers a return on their capital. Government subsidies through tax
breaks can be criticized as self-defeating in unemployment policy and as
cy improvement of the company, granted the rate increase citing inflation, regulatory lag, and lack of investor
confidence in utility); Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1982, § 1, at 2, col. 5 (Michigan Supreme Court holds financing
programs may not be reviewed by considering whether new generating capacity is needed).
173. "What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the
public convenience." Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898).
174. Boulding, Social Risk, Political Uncertainty, and the Legitimacy of Private Profit, in RISK AND
REGULATED FIRMS 85 (R. Howard ed. 1973). "[I]nterest to-day rewards no genuine sacrifice, any more than
does the rent of land .... J.M. KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
376 (1964). It might be noted here that classical economists tended to say the same thing about profit. R. MEEK,
STUDIES IN THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE 127 (2d ed. 1956).
175. The reproduction process is from Money (capital) to Commodities (e.g., electricity or telephone
services) to Money Expanded by Surplus Value (profit) (M--C-M'). For money to earn profit, commodities
must be produced; thus, money must serve a productive function before profit can be realized. K. UNO,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 50-70 (1964).
176. Karl Marx describes interest as that portion ofthe use-value ofmoney as capital (the ability to produce
surplus value) that falls to the lender. He notes that both lender and borrower expend the same sum of money as
capital. Since profit is not doubled by the existence of the same sum of money as capital for two persons, the
profit must be divided between the borrower and seller. Even when a shareholder functions as both owner and
employer of capital, and the capital yields the two parts of profit, only one profit still exists to be claimed. 3
K. MARX, CAPITAL 353 (1967 ed.).
When AFUDC is capitalized, shareholders are attempting to obtain double profit-the first is provided in
the rate of retum on the commodity produced, which accounts for the use-value of capital within the productive
process (shareholder as employer) and the use-value of money outside that process (shareholder as owner). The
second profit is an attempt to collect again the use-value of money outside the productive process.
177. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
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nonbeneficial to consumers who never see any reduction in their rates.'78 Tax
breaks may be criticized further as assistance to an industry that is not per-
forming poorly.'79
IV. STATE RESPONSE TO UTILITY CONSTRUCTION FINANCING
Statistics indicate that federal and state governments tend to reject con-
sumer criticism of current utility financing practices. Instead, the trend is
toward more extensive use of CWIP and AFUDC. Until 1976 the Federal
Power Commission'80 and many states disallowed the inclusion of CWIP in
the rate base. '8 ' In 1974 twenty-eight states permitted the inclusion of CWIP
in the rate base; 8 2 thirty-seven states did so in 1979.183 The amount of CWIP
allowed in the rate base of privately owned electric utilities skyrocketed by
345 percent from 1971 to 1980.84 In 1979 forty-two states permitted AFUDC
to be capitalized; 85 twenty-three states did so in 1974.186 From 1971 to 1980
AFUDC as a percentage of privately owned electric utility net income in-
creased from 28.5 percent to 41.2 percent. 87 Although more consumer
moneys are being used to finance construction, the capitalization of utilities
has been relatively static. Between 1971 and 1980 the capitalization of in-
vestor owned electric utilities remained fairly stable, with long-term debt
decreasing slightly from 54.2 percent to 50.2 percent and equity (preferred and
common stock and retained earnings) increasing slightly from 45.8 percent to
49.8 percent. '88
178. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text. "Electric utility stocks have become one of this year's
(1981) star performers .... Handel, CWIP, Meat-Ax Regulation, PUB. POWER, March-April 1982, at 26, 28
(quoting Nov. 12, 1981, Wall St. J.). "Overall, electric stocks for the past year have substantially outperformed
the market and fixed income securities ..... Id. (quoting Smith Barney Harris Upham utility analysts).
180. The Federal Power Commission was the precursor of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
181. Jones, A Defense of Rate Regulation in the Classic Style, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1980, at76, 76.
182. Characteristics of the Public Utility Regulatory Agencies in the United States, 28 BAYLOR L. REV.
1157, 1164-65 (1976).
183. Chart of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, at 416 (1979) (The Association
is based in Washington, D.C.) (variations in specific items, utility, circumstances, and time-frame requirements
for inclusion of CWIP; three states required an offset to income).
184. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED
ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1980-CLASSES A AND B COMPANIES 28 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES]. In 1971 construction work in progress accounted for
about 15% of electric net utility plant (all utility plant adjusted for depreciation, depletion, and amortization). By
1980 construction work in progress had increased to about 27% of electric net utility plant. Id.
185. Chart of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, at 416(1979) (The Association
is based in Washington, D.C.).
186. Characteristics of the Public Utility Regulatory Agencies in the United States, 28 BAYLOR L. REV.
1157, 1164-65 (1976).
187. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 8. AFUDC as a percent of net income
of privately owned utilities increased from 28.9% to 31.5% between 1974 and 1978. Id. Municipal utilities
decreased AFUDC as a percent of net income from 15.4% to 14.4% during that same period. ENERGY INFOR-
MATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES-1978, at 18 (1979).
188. The relative weights of preferred stock, common stock, and retained earnings also have shown little
variation. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 30. In other words, although more
consumer money is being used to finance construction, the industry's incentive to increase the rate base through
extensive construction programs has precluded the lowering of the debt component of capitalization.
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Whether CWIP or AFUDC is included in the rate base is determined by a
mixture of statute, 89 regulation, '90 and court decisions,' 9' depending upon the
state. The above statistics indicate the regulatory and legislative response to
CWIP, AFUDC, and the role of stockholders vis-h.-vis consumers in making
capital available to utilities. Since most states have adopted some form of an
administrative procedure act, 192 courts are limited in their powers of review.
Courts can determine whether a regulatory order or a statute falls outside the
power of the body promulgating it and whether a constitutional standard, such
as that set out in Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service
Commission,'93 has been violated.'94
Within this framework the courts have taken two basic approaches to
utility capital provision. The first is characterized by deferral to commission
judgment, with the proviso that the decision must meet federal constitutional
standards as set out in Bluefield. The second approach employs limited scru-
tiny of commission decisions, using some form of the used and useful stan-
dard' 95 to determine whether the order falls outside the agency's powers,
while retaining a deferential stance toward the commission and exhibiting
concern about the requirements of Bluefield.
A recent example of the first approach is Monongahela Power Co. v.
Public Service Commission, '% which outlined the steps in reviewing commis-
sion orders. The court initially should determine whether the commission has
abused its authority. The court then should ascertain whether evidence exists
to support the regulatory method chosen by the commission. Finally, the
court must decide whether the rates set are sufficient to maintain the com-
pany's financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate investors
while protecting the public. The commission must balance these divergent
interests. 197
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted a comparable ap-
proach in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Public Service Commission. 198 The
utility disputed the amount of CWIP allowed in the rate base. The commission
had disallowed a portion of the utility's request. Because of an anticipated
reduction in the utility's construction program, the commission found the
189. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133(b)(1) (Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4909.15(A)(1), (E)
(Page Supp. 1981).
190. Most states permit only limited review of regulatory orders. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1757
(Vest 1975) (review limited to constitutional questions; commission fact findings are final); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 54-7-16 (1963) (review limited to constitutional questions and whether commission has "regularly" pursued its
authority).
191. See, e.g., Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 4 Kan. App. 2d 674, 610 P.2d
121 (1980).
192. See supra note 190.
193. 262 U.S. 679 (1923). See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
194. See supra note 190.
195. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 84.
196. 276 S.E.2d 179 (W. Va. 1981).
197. Id. at 180.
198. 402 A.2d 14 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
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utility's suggestion for CWIP unrepresentative of the future period when the
new rates would be in effect.99 In affirming the commission order, the court
noted that D.C. Code section 43-706200 limited an appeal of a commission
order to questions of law, including constitutional questions. Commission fact
findings were conclusive unless "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. ''2°1
The court's test of reasonableness, derived from the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, was whether the company was permitted to earn a fair rate of
return on its investment. 202 The court would intervene only upon a "clear
showing" of a due process violation.0 3 If the result of a commission's order
was not arbitrary, the court would make no inquiry into its validity.204
Legislative Utility Consumers' Council v. Public Service Co. 205 held that
in reviewing a commission order the court considered commission determina-
tions of questions of fact as prima facie lawful and reasonable. The court
would reverse an order only if it were unlawflil, unjust, unreasonable, or an
abuse of the commission's discretion. 206 The court then considered, in more
detail than its own definition of the scope of review would allow, the Con-
sumers' Council challenges to the inclusion of CWIP. 2 7 The court, however,
held that since AFUDC is not mandated by law, its use was a factual deter-
mination for the commission.2°
The courts in this line of cases have abdicated their power of statutory
interpretation to the utility commissions. Legislative Utility Consumers'
Council holds that the commission decides what is used and useful. 2°9 Unless
the commission orders plainly are contrary to statute, irrational, or in viola-
tion of the fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibitions of confiscation of
property without due process, the courts refuse to intervene. Within these
limits, policy considerations and the balancing of investor and consumer in-
terests are left to the regulatory bodies and to the legislature. Since the
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 210 interpretation of the
199. Id. at 24-25.
200. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-706 (1973).
201. 402 A.2d 14, 17 (D.C. 1979).
202. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 380 A.2d 126, 131 (D.C. 1978), rev'd on rehearing,
402 A.2d 14 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 132.
205. 119 N.H. 332, 402 A.2d 626 (1979).
206. Id. at 340, 402 A.2d at 631.
207. In Legislative Utility Consumers' Council consumers had challenged the inclusion in the rate base of
CWIP for the Seabrook nuclear power plant. The court rejected their challenge, noting that the Consumers'
Council had not contended that the Seabrook expenditures were wasteful. The court claimed that the public had
an interest in attracting capital to meet increased demand. Additional reasons for including CWIP were that
CWIP did not represent a capital contribution, rather consumers paid the financing costs of construction earlier,
and most consumers remain as ratepayers to realize the eventual cost savings of CWIP over AFUDC. The court
analogized the situation of ratepayers who did not realize the lower cost to that of taxpayers who pay for schools
they do not use. (The court failed to recognize that tax moneys go to public use, whereas the return on CWIP
goes to private pockets.) The court also found that the utility offered sufficient evidence of financial need to
justify the use of this ratemaking device. Id. at 344, 348-50, 402 A.2d at 634, 637-38.
208. Id. at 345, 402 A.2d at 635.
209. Id. at 343, 402 A.2d at 633.
210. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
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fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition of property confiscation without
due process is based on the protection of investor interests, the courts limit
regulatory and legislative action only to the extent such action impinges upon
the property interests of investors.
In the second approach to capital provision courts engage in some very
circumscribed statutory interpretation. Usually this interpretation takes the
form of explanation rather than modification of commission orders. As pre-
viously noted, most states provide that a utility shall earn a return on property
that is "used and useful" or "used or required to be used" in the public
service.21 Historically, this test precluded the inclusion of CWIP in the rate
base.212 Interpreting used and useful in the public service requires the court to
examine whether a particular utility investment serves the public and to deter-
mine what constitutes serving the public.
In Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Commission21 3 a
utility claimed that the exclusion from its rate base of forty-eight gas wells,
completed but not connected to a gathering system, constituted a due process
violation.214 The company argued that the rates approved by the commission
would not provide a reasonable return or just compensation for the value of its
property.215 The Kansas court deferred to commission decisions about the
facts and the weight given them.2 6 The determination whether property was
"used or required to be used in the utility's services to the public'' 217 was left
to commission discretion unless it acted "unlawfully or arbitrarily without
supporting evidence." 21 8 The court then explained its test for used or required
to be used, noting that because something may be useful does not necessarily
mean it is required to be used. 2 9 This two-prong test could have been met by
the company had it shown the gas wells either were "used" or "required to be
used., 220 In affirming the commission's order, the court simply found that
Kansas-Nebraska had not shown that the gas wells were required. 22'
The court in Providence Gas Co. v. Burman222 concluded that 160,000
dollars of CWIP was properly excluded because it did not represent used and
useful property presently being devoted to providing the regulated service. 223
The court relied on the precedent set by New England Telephone & Tele-
21!. UTILITY RATEMAKING, supra note 2, at 52.
212. Jones,A Defense ofRate Regulation in the Classic Style, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1980, at 76,76.
213. 4 Kan. App. 2d 674, 610 P.2d 121 (1980).
214. Id. at 675, 610 P.2d at 124.
215. Id. at 675, 610 P.2d at 125.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 677, 610 P.2d at 126.
218. Id. at 675, 610 P.2d at 125.
219. Id. at 678, 610 P.2d at 126.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 679, 610 P.2d at 127.
Like Kansas-Nebraska, the court in West Penn. Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n affirmed
the commission's order to exclude CWIP by comparing its concept of used and useful with the factual situation
at hand. 50 Pa. Commonw. 164, 412 A.2d 903 (1980).
222. 376 A.2d 687 (R.I. 1977).
223. Id. at 692-93.
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graph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission. 24 In that case the utility requested
the inclusion in its rate base of more than six million dollars of plant under
construction. The utility argued that the inclusion of CWIP was necessary to
achieve its return on equity. 225 The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the
notion of injustice to investors, since interest charges of construction were
capitalized under AFUDC. 226 The court described the dispute as hinging on a
choice between accounting methods. The court held that it would not inter-
fere with the commission's methodology if the end result was "fair and
reasonable." - 27 The court's position was supported by a citation to Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 228 By excluding CWIP based on
the used and useful criterion and on deference to commission accounting
preferences, the Rhode Island Supreme Court made the investor-oriented test
of Hope the ultimate test of commission orders. The court thus indicated that
both deference to the commission and the concept of used and useful would
fall by the wayside if a utility's rates were not fair to investors.
Although all these courts presented at some length the reasons for their
decisions, they all were extremely deferential to commission determinations
of used and useful, affirming the regulatory body's decision in each of the
cases cited. While constrained by an administrative standard of review,
courts have the option of using statutory interpretation to reach more con-
sumer-oriented results. For example, if used and useful are defined narrowly,
the inclusion of CWIP in the rate base would be an order beyond the authority
of a commission that was mandated to include only used and useful items in
the rate base. The option of statutory interpretation itself is constrained by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Since
the Supreme Court, through Hope and Bluefield, virtually has made return on
investment a constitutional right, courts may not, by issuing opinions or by
deferring to agency decisions, interfere with that right.
In Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission,229 though
affirming the commission's decision to exclude CWIP as not used and useful,
the court grumbled that the agency's order was "barely above the point of
confiscation." 230 Although CWIP was excluded, the court was careful to
protect profits. The court warned the commission that rates must produce
enough revenue for the operating expenses and the capital cost of business,
which includes sufficient interest and dividends to attract capital.'
Perhaps this type of warning has contributed to what one utility specialist
views as the trend of commissions to give more attention to the rate of return
224. 116 R.I. 356, 387, 358 A.2d 1, 19 (1976).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
229. 231 Ga. 339, 201 S.E.2d 423 (1973).
230. Id. at 344, 201 S.E.2d at 427.
231. Id. at 344, 201 S.E.2d at 427-28.
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on equity than to the rate base calculations. 232 This switch has minor long-
term implications for utility rates. Statutes or rulings severely limiting CWIP,
AFUDC, or any other method of providing capital to investor owned utilities
are in one sense irrelevant to the consumer: experience shows that when the
rate base is decreased, the rate of return generally is increased to reach the
same revenue result as if the rate base had been left undiminished. 23 While
theorizing about whether to use CWIP, AFUDC, original cost, or fair market
valuation may be intellectually stimulating, that process bears little relation-
ship to Jane and John Doe's utility bills. 3 Whether regulation of the rates of
privately owned utilities is accomplished by court decision, statute, or ad-
ministrative rule, the tests of whether rates are just and reasonable are the
investor-oriented tests of Hope235 and Bluefield. 236
V. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT LEGAL RESPONSE
Revenue regulation is profit regulation, achieved through adjustments to
the rate of return, the rate base, or both. Revenues are established to provide
for operating expenses, interest charges, and a fair (nonmonopoly2 7) profit.
Privately owned utilities, of course, view profit growth as their top priority.
It is understood that private businessmen, like most other human beings, are
concerned with their own self interest. Indeed, economic theory not merely as-
sumes but positively expects them to engage in systematic profit maximization.
This means, in turn, that unless prevented from doing so by some force external to
themselves, entrepreneurs will overcharge and underproduce, thus enriching
themselves at the expense of society at large.
238
The dangers of unrestrained self-interest by monopoly capitalists were dis-
cussed throughout the body of this Comment. That the profit motive remains
unrestrained in the utility industry was demonstrated by statistics on the
dangers that have become realities-for example, utility bill increases and
excess capacity. 239
One reason for the failure of regulation is that privately owned utilities
virtually are guaranteed profits by the present reading of the Constitution. To
withstand a constitutional challenge, the states must set rates that provide a
fair profit to privately owned utilities. The Supreme Court has determined
232. Jones, A Defense ofRate Regulation in the Classic Style, PUB. UTIL., FORT., June 19, 1980,at76,76.
233. Butler, The Rate of Return in Texas-The Neglected Issue, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 945 (1976).
234. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 95TH CONG., IST. SESS., THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR: CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND PROB-
LEMS 15-16 (1977).
235. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
236. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
237. See supra notes 8 & 77 and accompanying text.
238. Munkirs, Ayers & Grandys, Rape of the Rate Payer: Monopoly Overcharges in the "Regulated"
Electric Utility Industry, 8 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 57, 66 (1976).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35 & 65-69. Additional evidence of the failure of regulation is
its inability to prevent monopoly overcharges of some 26% of operating income of 40 investor owned electric
utilities in 1972. Munkirs, Ayers & Grandys, Rape of the Rate Payer: Monopoly Overcharges in the "Regu-
lated" Electric Utility Industry, 8 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 57, 58 (1976).
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that a fair profit is a return on investment that is fair to investors. 40 The
question is not whether consumers can afford a basic necessity, or whether
customers of privately owned utilities are getting the service they want and
for which they pay, but whether owners of capital find a particular utility's
rate of return attractive enough to invest in it.
The courts, while able conceivably to bring small victories to consumers
through more active and less deferential statutory interpretation, ultimately
are laboring under a standard of review 24' that places the big guns in the hands
of the shareholders. One judge expressed it plainly: "[T]he one critical result
which courts can understand and the only thing they need address is the
constitutionality of the utility's rate of return on its invested capital. Courts
are indispensable to the health of regulated industries .... 242
Regulatory commissions must work within the same constraints; share-
holder interests must take priority over consumer interests. An example is a
Depression-era decision of the Ohio regulatory commission. 243 Consumers
had complained to the commission that while the prices of other commodities
had dropped, utility prices had not. 244 The commission somewhat apologet-
ically explained that utility rates could not be calculated upon the ability of the
consumer to pay. Rather, the law mandated that rates be determined to give a
just return for property used and useful in supplying services. 245 This rationale
is as little comfort to consumers today as it was in 1933. For again, consumers
plausibly may win a few more battles246 and still lose the war.
Consumer representation at rate hearings is vastly overrated as a means
to control utility rate hikes. One need only look at the statistics on utility bill
increases to come to this conclusion. Consumers do not have the financial or
legal resources to battle well-equipped armies of utility lawyers. Responding
to the question why consumers pay so much when utility profits are so high,
New York State Consumer Protection Board executive director Karen
Burstein replied that utilities have "giant resources, gather masses of infor-
mation that they feed to utility boards, which rely on such information to
make rate decisions .... The information is available to advo-
240. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Blueield Water Works &
Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
242. Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 276 S.E.2d 179, 189 (f. Va. 1981) (Neely, C.J.,
concurring).
243. In re West Jefferson Power & Light Co., 1933D Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 163 (Ohio P.U.C. 1933).
244. Id. at 164.
245. Id.
246. Reform is particularly feasible for courts' or regulatory agencies' treatment of operating expenses,
such as advertising and charitable contributions, and the accounting treatment of tax credits. However, while
these items may mean millions of dollars for a particular utility, they are petty cash compared to rate base and
rate of return. Regarding rate base, commissions might exercise more caution in authorizing an investment. But
not all investments require preauthorization. And once authorized, almost daily supervision by regulators would
be required to counteract shareholder incentive to expand and lengthen any capital-intensive project, since
shareholders would rationalize most management decisions as reasonable exercises of judgement.
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cates,... but is couched in obfuscating language that only the utilities
understand." 
247
State-sponsored agencies that represent consumers in hearings often suf-
fer from the same lack of resources and from institutional barriers to effective
representation of their clients. These barriers include lack of communication
with consumers and political pressures from within state government. Gover-
nors who appoint the heads of consumer-counsel offices and later run for
office probably consider utility campaign contributions helpful. A further
example of institutional barriers is the funding of the Division of Rate Counsel
of the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate. Its funding for oppos-
ing utility requests is a percentage of the amount each company finally is
granted. 248 This funding arrangement may serve as a disincentive to vigorous
opposition to rate hikes.
Better equipped consumers and more independent and financially secure
agencies are bandaid solutions. No matter how committed and articulate the
consumer advocates, consumers, or agencies, they still are at the mercy of
regulatory commissions and courts that are constrained by the investor-
oriented tests of Hope and Bluefield.
Legislation is the most potent medicine for profit fever. If the legislature
acts to regulate privately owned utilities more efficiently by removing items
from the rate base or by altering the method of determining the rate of return,
the legislature will have used surgery, politically painful and costly, to treat
the symptoms without removing the cancer-the profit orientation of util-
ities. 249 Furthermore, that surgery will be reversible by the courts under the
Hope and Bluefield tests:
The most serious and pervasive limitation on the exercise of the state's powers of
control over public utilities is to be found in the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment .... [T]his interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment has seriously interfered with the freedom of the legislature in the
choice of the appropriate instrumentalities and procedures for regulation, and has
conferred on the judiciary veto power in virtually all matters pertaining to the
control of the rates and charges of regulated enterprises. 250
Instead of viewing the patient as a privately owned utility, the patient should
be seen as an enterprise providing a basic necessity to the public. The ques-
tion then can be expanded from, "How do we balance the public interest with
the interest of shareholders in a return on their investment?" to, "How do we
provide utility services to consumers as efficiently and at as low a price as
247. N.Y. Times, April 18, 1982, § XI, at 15, col. I.
248. Id.
249. The first part of this Comment showed that profit orientation is conducive to overexpansion, costly
technological choices, and other utility ills. See supra text accompanying notes 33-85.
250. I.R. BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 287 (1947).
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
possible without adverse public impact?"' This latter query allows us to
question not only the monopoly position of utilities but also the private
ownership of a basic necessity.
VI. ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF UTILITY INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
A. Competition-An Ill-Fated Choice
Some writers urge the restoration of competition to the utility industry. 2
They believe competition will limit abusive utility practices .5  Competition,
however, does not restrain the profit motive, which causes price increases, so
much as it allows consumers to choose their sellers to avoid the more blatant
expressions of that motive, such as outrageous prices. Since utilities are
natural monopolies, demand is not sufficiently elastic2 to allow for effective
bargain hunting.
Furthermore, competition would lead to exceedingly inefficient use of
scarce resources. 5 5 Even when competition and multiple suppliers might be
efficient-possibly for solar energy or telephone communications'26 -the
vision of capitalists is not so clouded by the profit motive that they cannot see
that self-interest sometimes is achieved best by cooperation with other cap-
italists with the same self-interest. Although antitrust litigation may control
some profit-seeking cabals, its ineffectiveness is illustrated by the recent
A.T.&T. antitrust settlement. 257 It seems more rational to forego competition
with its foreseeable pitfalls and instead to look at other possibilities.
B. Public Ownership-A Proven Alternative
Public ownership of utilities often is overlooked as a solution to utility
dilemmas. This omission is due to the political and economic myths that
accompany the very utterance of the words "public ownership."- 28 For this
251. Adverse public impact might take the form of pollution, health and safety problems, environmental
destruction, or negative effects on other sectors of the economy.
252. See, e.g., Munkirs, Ayers & Grandys, Rape of the Rate Payer: Monopoly Overcharges in the
"Regulated" Electric Utility Industry, 8 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 57 (1976).
253. Id.
254. A person is far less likely to forego heating his or her home until heat is offered at a sufficiently low
price than he or she is to delay buying a record album or a new suit. Furthermore, it is not feasible to adapt all
homes to alternate energy sources, unlike the way one suit usually can be substituted easily for another.
255. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
256. M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 196-97, 205-10 (1980).
257. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1982, § IV, at 12, col. 5 (National Association of Regulatory Utility Commis-
sioners says proposed breakup of A.T.&T. will lead to higher telephone rates); Future of Bell System Debt,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1982, at D 1, col. 3 (local rate increases probable because of lower credit ratings expected as
a result of a lack of A.T.&T. umbrella); U.S. Settles Phone Suit, Drops I.B.M. Case; A.T.&T. to Split Up,
Transforming Industry, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at 1, col. 4 (A.T.&T. president estimates local rates will
double in next few years).
258. See, e.g., Ritchie, The Power Question-Let Us Not Go Revolutionary, in SHOULD THE GOVERN-
MENT OWN AND OPERATE ELECTRIC UTILITIES 297-311 (E. Buehler ed. 1936) (address given by the Gover-
nor of Maryland before the Section of Public Utility Law of the American Bar Association, 1931). The utility
industry launched a campaign in 1949 against government ownership under the slogan, "Government in Any
Business is Socialism." Love, Reddy Kilowatt's Dark Hour, PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 1974, at 47.
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reason, understanding the differences between laissez-faire capitalism and
monopoly capitalism, and between state capitalism and socialism, is funda-
mental to framing discussion of public utility issues.
1. Relationship of Public Ownership of Utilities to Economic Systems
Capitalism is an economic system in which all or most of the means of
production are privately owned and operated for profit. 59 Laissez-faire
capitalism operates without governmental regulation or control; 260 the owners
of business and industry set the ground rules for labor, product quality, com-
petition, and prices.
Those systems that continue to fly the laissez-faire banner today ... accept, with
varying degrees of steadfastness, a commitment to use fiscal and monetary pol-
icies in pursuit of high employment and output levels.
More traditional concepts of laissez faire do not permit even this, and in the
libertarian version the government's role is limited to "preventing" one man from
261injuring another.
The motto of laissez-faire proponents is, "To govern better ... one must
govern less." ' 262 A regulated utility is anathema to a laissez-faire believer
because, short of government ownership, it is hard to conceptualize more
government involvement with business.263
"Monopoly capitalism" describes what most economists recognize: the
classical model of a freely competitive and self-adjusting economy no longer
reflects present capitalist reality.264 In the classical model, prices are deter-
mined by the bids of many buyers and sellers, each too small to affect the
outcome by his or her own action.265 Just as society's notions of morality
change, so economic systems change with the times.
In modern society, with its elaborate and costly technique and productive
processes conducted with intricate specialisation [sic] and mechanisation [sic], it
is impossible for every man to run his own productive process. To start production
needs capital in very large amounts-amounts quite out of reach of anyone who
has not accumulated quite a pile (or at least is in a position, socially or economical-
ly, to draw other capitalists into partnership with him-as everyone knows, no-
body lends to a man who has nothing at all).
What this amounts to is that in modem society a system of individual owner-
ship of means of production must mean at the same time a concentration of such
ownership into relatively few hands. This very fact of concentration implies its
opposite, the lack of ownership on the part of others-in fact, of the majority of
the population. 2 6
259. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 269 (unabr. 2d ed. 1970).
260. Id. at 1015.
261. R. CARSON, COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 451-52 (1973).
262. J.M. KEYNES, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND COMMUNISM 25 (1926).
263. Some might argue that utilities are regulated in form but not in substance.
264. P. SWEEZY, Theories of the New Capitalism, in MODERN CAPITALISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 66
(1972).
265. Id.
266. M. DOBB, CAPITALISM YESTERDAY AND TODAY 21 (1962) (italics in original).
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Business no longer is dominated by the small, individually owned firm, but by
the giant corporation, 67 which controls so large a share of the market that it
can, within fairly wide limits, set its own prices without typical market con-
siderations.2" And as much as the small business, the large corporation is
profit oriented 269-striving for ever larger profits and, because of its influen-
tial market position, achieving them.70
State ownership of utilities would not transform either laissez-faire or
monopoly capitalism into socialism. As previously noted, under capitalism
most, but not all, of the means of production are privately owned. Govern-
ment ownership of utilities would leave most of the means of production
(land, machines, factories, and raw materials271) in the hands of individuals.
Assuming all utilities were government owned, at most this would resemble
state capitalism-an economy in which the government owns large numbers
of fundamental industries, but in which a small class, the capitalists, 272
dominates the government.273
Socialism, on the other hand, means not only that the means of produc-
tion are publicly owned, but also that they are managed by the public for the
benefit of the public-not for the benefit of a small class of people. 274
The motive of production is no longer the maximisation [sic] of profit: it is the
maximum benefit of society. The decision as to what and how much to produce,
how many new factories, power stations, etc., are to be constructed, will no longer
267. The approximately 1,250 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange accounted for 20% of all
workers, 40% of all sales, and over 70% of all corporate income in 1971. L. ENGEL, How TO BUY STOCK 51
(5th rev. ed. 3d printing 1972). In 1976, while only .7% of active corporations had assets of $25 million or more,
the larger corporations accounted for 83% of total corporate assets. 1980 U.S. DEP-T OF COMMERCE STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT U.S. no. 949, at 566. The largest businesses, .1% of all corporations, had $250 million or
more assets and controlled 65.8% of all assets of American corporations. Id.
268. P. SWEEZY, Theory of the New Capitalism, in MODERN CAPITALISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 67
(1972).
269. According to one empirical study, large corporations are more profit oriented than small businesses.
Earley, The Impact of Some New Developments in Economic Theory, 1956 AM. ECON. A. PROC. passim (1957).
270. Less than one-tenth of 1% of all industrial corporations accounted for over 65% of all industrial net
income less deficit. 1980 U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT U.S. no. 950, at 567. In 1979
those manufacturing corporations with assets of $1 billion or more took in 62.6% of all net profit earned by
manufacturing corporations. Id. no. 955, at 569.
271. L. HUBERMAN & P. SWEEZY, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIALISM 23 (1968).
272. State capitalism, if occurring under present conditions, would take the form of state monopoly capital-
ism, in which monopoly capitalists would dominate the government.
[Alt a stage of history where such a high concentration of economic power is reached as is the case
under monopoly capitalism, the State machine becomes an instrument of the dominant monopoly
groups ....
... To say that the State is an instrument of monopoly and tends to further its interests even when
these conflict with that of other capitalists is not to exclude the possibility that the State may at times
pursue policies that operate in the interest of the system as a whole-in the sense of trying to keep
capitalism as a mode of production operating on an even keel .... To the extent that the State takes
measures to ensure the latter, it may temporarily appear in the role of an "independent" mediator,
"reconciling" sectional interests within the ruling class, or even at times of acute class tension seeking
to mollify antagonism between classes and to "reconcile" them.
M. DOBB, CAPITALISM YESTERDAY AND TODAY 77-78 (1962) (emphasis in original). See generally N.
POULANTZAS, CLASSES IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM (1975).
273. H. LAIDLER, SOCIALISM IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 195 n.10 (1920).
274. L. HUBERMAN & P. SWEEZY, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIALISM 61 (1968).
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be limited by the consideration of whether these will yield sufficient profit to the
capitalist: such decisions will be made solely in the light of the usefulness of such
things to society (the cost to society of producing them, of course, also being taken
into account). -
Even if government ownership of utilities provides cheaper and better
service to consumers, it does not necessarily change the relation of utility
workers to their employers or obviate the danger that a small ruling class will
pervert the benefits of public ownership. 76 Thus, government ownership of
utilities should neither conjure up images of the "red plague" in the eyes of
staunch capitalists, nor spur unrealistic hopes in the hearts of socialists.
Government involvement in and regulation of business has been accepted
since the early days of America. 277 Government provision of seed money for
new ventures-for example, the railways in the first half of the nineteenth
century or the synfuels industry at present-was and is welcomed by the
business community.2 78 And examples exist besides municipally owned util-
ities of direct government ownership of business or management of business-
like operations: the Army Corps of Engineers, the Interior Department's
Bureau of Land Reclamation, 279 Wisconsin's State Life Fund, the Bank of
North Dakota, the Port Authority of New York, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, and the U.S. Postal Service.28°
In the United States public involvement in private enterprise usually
occurs only when an enterprise no longer is profitable to private capitalists
(e.g., Amtrak) and yet is necessary to the maintenance of commerce (e.g., the
Postal Service, whose rates subsidize businesses more than individuals281 ).
Alternatively, when the government completes its task of bolstering or devel-
oping an industry, such as synthetic rubber, the healthy industry is trans-
ferred into private hands at bargain prices.2n Considering with what resources
and industries government enterprises are working and under what circum-
stances they are operating, government-managed enterprises are doing sur-
prisingly well.
2. Public Versus Private Ownership
Public ownership of utilities is a viable and proven alternative to private
ownership. In 1970 there were approximately 400 investor owned electric
utilities, 2,065 publicly owned utilities (5 of which were federal systems), and
275. M. DOBB, ECONOMICS OF CAPITALISM 24 (1942).
276. See THE BATTLE OF CLEVELAND passimn (D. Marschall ed. 1979); H. LAIDLER, SOCIALISM IN
THOUGHT AND ACTION 198-99 (1920).
277. E.g., limitations on crop production, oil industry regulations, and food and drug laws. See generally S.
PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 260-62 (1980).
278. A. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM 298-329 (1969).
279. Id. at 323.
280. M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 65-70 (1980).
281. Id. at 65.
282. Id. at 63-64.
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955 Rural Electrification Administration (REA) cooperatives.28 3 In 1980 there
were approximately 217 investor owned electric utilities, 2,199 publicly
owned utilities (8 of which were federal systems), and 924 rural electric
cooperatives.18
One of the benefits of public ownership is a lower cost to the consumer.
In 1980 the average annual residential electric bill for an investor owned utility
285customer was 457 dollars, compared with 405 dollars for a customer of a
municipally owned utility. 286 The difference in bills-52 dollars-is even more
impressive because the larger investor owned utility bill represented only
8,531 kilowatt hours, 87 while the lower municipal bill represented 10,744
kilowatt hours.28 8 The cost of electricity to investor owned utility customers
was over 42 percent more-5.36 cents per kilowatt hour2 89 compared to the
publicly owned utility's 3.77 cents per kilowatt hour. 290 In 1976 administrative
expenses of municipal utilities were approximately one-third lower than for
investor owned utilities.29' In 1980 municipally owned utilities continued to
have lower administrative expenses per customer than privately owned util-
ities.292 Publicly owned utilities consistently have lower accounting, collec-
tion, customer service, information, and sales expenses per kilowatt hour sold
than privately owned utilities. 93
Statistics on the cost savings to consumers should be examined fully
when citizens and legislatures begin to explore public ownership. Some of the
arguments discrediting the cost savings of public ownership are dismissed
easily. One argument is that publicly owned utilities are able to provide
energy at a lower cost because they do not pay taxes. Private utilities, how-
283. SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY & POWER, COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., STATISTICAL MATERIALS ON THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 5 (1976).
In 1980 privately owned utilities accounted for 78% of all electricity generated in the United States, federal
projects for 10.3%, municipal utilities for 3.8%, and cooperatives for 2.8%. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC
UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 15. Other publicly owned systems, such as state systems, accounted for 5.2% of
all electricity generated. Public Power Directory, PUB. POWER, Jan.-Feb. 1982, D-l, D-2.
In 1978 federal utilities had slightly over 13,000 customers (retail and wholesale), municipal utilities had
slightly more than 8.5 million customers, and privately owned utilities had over 67 million customers. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PUBLICLY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES-1978, at 15, 20 (1979); PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184,
at 34. By 1980 publicly owned systems of all types served almost one-fourth of all electric customers. Public
Power Directory, PUB. POWER, Jan.-Feb. 1982, D-l, D-4.
284. Public Power Directory, PUB. POWER, Jan.-Feb. 1982, D-l, D-4.
285. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 35.
286. Kilmer, Public Power Costs Less, PUB. POWER, May-June 1982, at 26 (based on data from the
Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration).
287. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 11.
288. Kilmer, Public Power Costs Less, PUB. POWER, May-June 1982, at 26.
289. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 35.
290. Kilmer, Public Power Costs Less, PUB. POWER, May-June 1982, at 26.
291. Shorts, POWER LINE, Aug. 1979, at 2.
292. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 34, 38; ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PUBLICLY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES INTHE UNITED
STATES-1980, at 7 (1981).
293. Kilmer, Public Power Costs Less, PUB. POWER, May-June 1982, at 26, 27-28 ("Customer service,
information, and sales" formerly was listed by the Department of Energy as "promotion and advertising.").
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ever, pay little or no tax because of investment tax credits and accelerated
depreciation. In 1971 utilities paid 6.2 percent of their revenues in taxes. 29' In
1980 federal income tax paid was only 1.3 percent of electric operating rev-
enues. 295 With section 201 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981296
creating Internal Revenue Code section 168297 to accelerate depreciation even
more, investor owned utilities will be paying still less of their revenues to the
government. In contrast, public power systems often provide free street light
or other municipal services, including direct contributions to a town's general
fund, in lieu of taxes.298
Some of public power's cost savings may be the result of access to
low-cost federal and state hydroelectric power, 299 but these savings do not
account for the entire cost difference. Privately owned systems also have
access to hydroelectric power.300 Furthermore, while geography places limits
on the choice of hydroelectric technology, the same is not true of the choices
between nuclear power, coal generation, solar power, cogeneration, or con-
servation. One more likely may look to public power's efficiency (for ex-
ample, in holding down administrative expenses) and its lack of stockholders
for the principal bases of public power's cost savings.
These cost savings are not the only considerations in the investigation of
public ownership. Whether shareholders are a necessary and functioning
party in the provision of utilities is another consideration. In this Comment's
examination of CWIP and other methods of ensuring sufficient capital in-
fusion to utilities, shareholders were found to be potentially excludable from
capital-acquiring arrangements.30' Shareholders earned profits on money
supplied by consumers 302 or asked for and received double profits on money
they supplied.0 3
The debt-to-equity ratio of privately owned utilities appears to have been
relatively stable over the years, with utility prices rising.3 4 As long as utilities
must borrow money and pay for it, public ownership has a definite advantage
294. Love, Reddy Kilowatt's Dark Hour, PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 1974, at 47, 50; see also AMERICAN PUB.
POWER ASS'N, THE PUBLIC BENEFITS OF PUBLIC POWER 12 (1980) (In 1978 privately owned utilities paid
approximately 6% of their net income in federal taxes, although the corporate tax rate was 46%.).
295. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 33.
296. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 168). This law dramatically
accelerated depreciation schedules for utilities. Property that in the past had a tax life of more than 25 years now
has a tax life for depreciation purposes of only 15 years. Utilities will receive larger deductions from taxable
income in a shorter period of time.
297. I.R.C. § 168 (Supp. V 1981).
298. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR: CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND PROB-
LEMS 47 (1977). In 1978 publicly owned utilities provided over one billion kilowatt hours free of charge.
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PUBLICLY OWNED ELECTRIC
UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES-1978, at 17 (1979).
299. Public Power Fact Sheet by the American Public Power Association (May 1982).
300. PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, supra note 184, at 13.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 159-60.
302. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35 & 178.
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over private ownership because the government can incur debt at a much
lower interest rate. Municipal utilities can offer revenue bonds to raise cap-
ital. The interest on these bonds is tax free; thus, the utility can offer the
bonds at a lower interest rate to reduce its costs, 305 while providing investors
with post-tax returns competitive with those of bonds offered by the private
sector. The same tax-free bonds can help to take over a privately owned
utility. Provisions can be made to buy shareholders' equity interest, for
example, through the floating of bonds or through an arrangement to buy out
shareholders gradually from the net revenues realized by the utility.
316
Another consideration in opting for public ownership is that the profit
motive severely hampers and is in conflict with the provision, in the public
interest, of a basic necessity. The shareholders' desire to increase earnings
through rate base inflation has led to excess capacity and to the choice of
capital-intensive technology. Consumers, environmentalists, and labor have
an interest in keeping the rate base to a minimum through conservation,
repair, investment in more labor-intensive technologies, and the elimination
of incentives to overexpand, such as CWIP. The self-interest of the public in
the elimination of CWIP is paralleled by the self-interest of publicly owned
utilities. While the reasons that municipally owned systems oppose CWIP
differ somewhat from those of customers,3 7 what is important is not that
each reason behind the self-interest be identical, but that, whatever the
reason, the self-interest of publicly owned utilities is aligned more closely with
the self-interest of customers than is the self-interest of shareholders. Further,
the community can set the goals of a publicly owned utility 3 s and can make
basic decisions, such as a plant location and rate of expansion. The commun-
ity can make these decisions in public forums or can hold those people that
make these decisions electorally accountable.3s
305. AMERICAN PUB. POWER ASSOC., THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE 6-7 (1974).
306. Care should be taken to avoid overcompensating shareholders. It is questionable whether any com-
pensation should be made to General Public Utilities and Jersey Central Power & Light (of Three Mile Island
fame). Compensation would be a state salvage of poor shareholder and managment judgment. Rather, com-
mentators have suggested that the company be permitted to go bankrupt, the state then assuming the utility's
service function. See Grygiel & Zarillo, Three Mile Island: The New Jersey Regulatory Response, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Dec. 18, 1980, at 23, 27; N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1982, § XI, at 3, col. 3 (utility receptive to idea of state
takeover).
307. Municipally owned systems opposed CWIP because it provided no incentive to investor owned
utilities to conserve resources. Thus, investor owned utilities had no incentive to interconnect with public
systems. Municipal systems, which are often wholesale customers of investor owned utilities, also complained
that CWIP forced them to carry both the cost of privately owned utility investment and their own investment.
CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 101, at 84-86.
308. The questionable nuclear power thrust of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) comes more from its
original purpose of power production to stimulate private enterprise in the region than from its public character.
If the goal of the TVA was changed from developmental to environmental, its thrust would be away from
nuclear power. M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 66-68 (1980).
309. COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP ORGANIZING PROJECT, THE CITIES' WEALTH 32 (1976); M. CARNOY
& D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 241 (1980).
Election of public utilities commissioners is not the equivalent of democratic reform through the public
ownership of utilities. If private capital is used, public utilities commissioners, elected or not, must regulate
utilities with the goal of producing profit for those utilities. Thus, election of utilities commissioners is a placebo
for the underlying economic ills of private ownership.
[Vol. 43:821
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
Public accountability can shield against government officials who are too
friendly with the local construction industry or with a privately owned utility
company that wants the service territory of the municipal system.3 '0 The
ability to vote the managers or their supervisors out of office creates an
element of public control unachievable even with elected utility commis-
sioners. While elected commissioners must battle profit-oriented utilities and
regulate rates within Hope's profit-protecting guidelines, government officials
managing or supervising publicly owned systems only need be concerned with
providing utility service at the lowest possible cost, not with protecting and,
at the same time, restraining profits.
Publicly owned systems to some extent will be subject to the whims of
the bond market including large institutional investors, such as banks. If
private investors attempt economic blackmail, publicly owned systems could
consider bond offerings accessible to their customers, for example, offerings
in smaller denominations. Alternately, the utility could spearhead a move-
ment for the governmental unit of which it is a part to establish a community
bank3 ' or a state bank 312 to ensure that sufficient capital is available for
endeavors beneficial to the public.
Public ownership need not be limited to electric utilities. Gas, water, and
telephone utilities also are legitimate and viable subjects for public owner-
ship.3"3 Legislative bodies should open the debate on whether shareholders
are performing their function as capital providers satisfactorily or whether
they have outlived their economic usefulness in the utility industry. Pro-
ponents of public ownership will have to stage hard-fought and well-organized
campaigns to stimulate serious consideration of their proposals. 314 But since
all utility customers benefit from public ownership-and nearly everyone is a
customer of at least one privately owned utility company-enlightened self-
interest eventually will alter the face of the utility industry.
Susan D. Fendell
310. See THE BATrLE OF CLEVELAND passim (D. Marschall ed. 1979).
311. COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP ORGANIZING PROJECT, THE CITIES' WEALTH 37-38 (1976); Lee,
National Consumer Cooperative Bank, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Jan. 1981, at 38; What the Coop Bank Can Do In
Energy, CO-OP BANK MONITOR, May 1980, at 8.
312. M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 69-70, 124 (1980).
313. There are nine municipal telephone systems remaining in the United States and Puerto Rico. COM-
MUNITY OWNERSHIP ORGANIZING PROJECT, THE CITIES' WEALTH 34-35 (1976).
314. Attempts to municipalize Pacific Gas & Electric Company in Berkeley, California, were fought at
every turn. Although the issue was raised yearly before the city council, it was not until the sixth year, 1971, that
the council agreed to commission a feasibility study of public ownership. When placed on the ballot in 1973,
utility and corporate allies heavily outspent public-power proponents and also gave large contributions to those
candidates opposed to the measure. The ordinance was defeated 42% to 58%. The next year, while again vastly
outspent, the proponents gained support and won 47.5% of the vote. Id. at 33.
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